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Abstract
Current cybersecurity best practices, techniques, tactics and procedures are insuffi-
cient to ensure the protection of Android systems. Software tools leveraging formal
methods use mathematical means to assure both a design and implementation for a
system and these methods can be used to provide security assurances. The goal of
this research is to determine methods of assuring isolation when executing Android
software in a contained environment. Specifically, this research demonstrates security
properties relevant to Android software containers can be formally captured and vali-
dated, and that an implementation can be formally verified to satisfy a corresponding
specification.
A three-stage methodology called “The Formal Verification Cycle” is presented.
This cycle focuses on the iteration over a set of security properties to validate each
within a specification and their verification within a software implementation. A secu-
rity property can be validated when its functional language prototype (e.g. a Haskell
coded version of the property) is converted and processed by a formal method (e.g.
a theorem proof assistant). This validation of the property enables the definition
of the property in a software specification, which can be implemented separately in
an imperative programming language (e.g. the Go programming language). Once
the implementation is complete another formal method can be used (e.g. symbolic
execution) to verify the imperative implementation satisfies the validated specifica-
tion. Successful completion of this cycle shows a given implementation is equivalent
to a functional language prototype, and this cycle assures a specification for the o-
riginal desired security properties was properly implemented. This research shows an
application of this cycle to develop Assured Android Execution Environments.
iv
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ASSURED ANDROID EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS
I. Introduction
I.1 Current Issues with Android Security
In 2017 it was reported that Android comprises two thirds of the smart phone
market. In the same year the operating system (OS) hit a new milestone: two bil-
lion monthly active users [1] [2]. The market saturation and active number of users
indicates that approximately one in four people in the world use an Android device.
Unfortunately, many of the types of threats to desktops and servers also apply to
mobile devices. A way to quantify these threats on Android is to consider MITRE
Corporation’s Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). Each CVE describes
a vulnerability, usually in significant detail, as well as its vector of attack and the
impact on a software product. One source, CVEDetails.com, has analyzed and con-
solidated CVE information into 13 categories of vulnerabilities [3]. These categories
have seven major classes of threats to Android. The data from the website from 2009
through 2017 shows there are 1533 CVEs, and the breakout is the threats are seen in
Figure 1. This information is independently verifiable with analysis from the National
Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) using scripts found in Appendix A.2.
Malicious actors generally seek new methods and resources for their attacks, and
those targeting the Android operating system are no exception. All categories of
CVEs are growing, and some threat categories (e.g., code execution, overflow, gain
information, gain privileges) have seen over 300% growth within the past few years.
Evaluation of the CVEs indicates that 83% of the vulnerabilities on Android
1
Figure 1. Android CVEs by Vulnerability 2009-2017
impact the proper execution and protection of information (i.e., the vulnerabilities
described by the CVEs, except for Denial of Services, affect applications and their
data). The top three CVE classes in Figure 1 can be interpreted as mechanisms used
to execute code or gain information without OS permission.
One way to manage such threats and vectors is virtualize and isolate application-
s, because a contained environment prevents undesired access as well as unintended
access (e.g., overflow access). Although not the primary goal one goal of the Android
Security Sandbox is application virtualization and isolation. However, a concern with
the sandbox is that its design and implementation is open to the vulnerabilities de-
scribed by the CVEs. At this time there is no public documentation that shows
validation of the sandbox’s specification or verification of its implementation. There-
fore, a new containment solution is needed to assure a sandbox-like design fulfills
security claims.
I.2 Problem Definition Development
The current and future threats to Android are such that new and enhanced securi-
ty measures are needed. One technique to reduce cyberattack surfaces, by validating
a specification and verifying an implementation, relies on formal methods. The cur-
2
rent literature does not claim the use of formal method tools and techniques in the
development of Android or its applications. Android lacks formally verified solutions
specifically that has assured containment of (1) malicious application execution on a
trusted device, and (2) a trusted app on a malicious device. Therefore, this research
explores the application of formal methods to assure Android containment. With a
primary focus on malicious software applications.
I.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis
As it stands there is no established or de facto standard set of methods for the
formal assurance of software containment. Also, there is no standard set of security
properties for software containment. Hence, this research seeks to determine what
security properties are required for Android containment that can be assured through
formal methods, and to establish representative methods that can be used to validate
security properties within a specification and verify the subsequent implementation
of a software product. In particular, this research is seeking answers to the questions:
• “Can an assured software container system be developed for Android?”
• “What would be the methods to accomplish this task?”
To answer these questions several tasks need to occur including:
• Determine if any formally verified products can be ported to Android
• Develop formal methods to support a verified execution environment on Android
• Prototype an implementation of an validated specification
By completing these tasks, this research demonstrates that containment security
properties can be identified, validated, and captured in a specification and implement-
3
ed in a verified Android software container. The following sections detail the planned
approach, outline research contributions, and provide an overview to the thesis.
I.4 Approach
For an assured Android containment product to be realized a set of security prop-
erties must be identified. Additionally, these security properties must be assurable
with formal methods. Specifically once the properties are defined, a specification of
each property must be validated and its implementation in a programming language
must be verified. Thus, three stages of research are presented to illustrate the pro-
posed formal approach. The first stage consolidates a set of security properties that
can be validated with formal methods. The second and third stages demonstrate
formal processes for the validation of a given property in a specification and its verifi-
cation in an implementation. Specifics of these stages are detailed in Chapter 3, and
related findings are presented in Chapter 4.
I.5 Research Contributions
This research provides three specific contributions:
• A formalized set of security properties for Android containment specifications
• A proposed Android Framework for formal assurance
• Proposed techniques of formally Android specifications and implementations
I.6 Thesis Overview
The second chapter discusses the technical background and related research per-
taining to both formal methods and Android containment. Chapter 3 presents As-
sured Android Execution Environments, which is a framework that encapsulates the
4
proposed security properties and the Formal Verification Cycle. Details relating to
the three stage approach used in this research are outlined emphasizing the tools used
to test the proposed framework. Chapter 4 details the results and findings, and the
final chapter presents the research conclusions and recommendations for future work.
5
II. Background and Related Research & Technology
This chapter examines the four primary technology areas needed for this thesis
(i.e., formal methods, containerization, Android, and existing security models and
frameworks), and concludes with a discussion on related research. Due to the com-
plexity of some of the topics, both introductory discussions and specific technology
implementations are provided. This information is intended to serve as both an in-
troduction and reference guide for readers and future researchers alike. Additionally,
some of this documentation familiarizes key technologies, because of their use for
modeling the approach, design, and implementation methods for Android container
assurance.
II.1 Formal Methods
General Background
Before showing examples of what formal methods, or how they are used in this
research, some definitions are needed. According to Schmeelk, formal methods “are
a set of mathematical representations of a system which can be verified,” and formal
assurance “is the attempt to use formal methods to validate design requirements or
specifications” [4]. Additional terms needing definition are validation and verifica-
tion, and with respect to this research these two terms will adhere to the definitions
provided by Tran via the IEEE Standard Glossary [5]. Validation is an evaluation to
determine if a system satisfies specified requirements, and it can happen during or
at the end of a development process. Verification is a process to evaluate developed
products of a system satisfying the conditions imposed at the start of that design
phase. A final topic to consider is Software Engineering, which is defined by Press-
man as the establishment and use of sound engineering principles to obtain software
6
that is reliable and efficient [6].
This research presents a working definition for formal assurance as: the use of
formal methods to (1) validate the original requirements of a specification and/or
(2) verify developed products satisfying a (validated) specification. Formal assurance
shows the correctness of a design when leveraging both validation and verification,
and the specific formal methods techniques used can vary for either validation or
verification. Also, shorthand terms for formal assurance (e.g., assurance, assured and
assurable) are based on the working definition in this thesis.
Schmeelk states that correctness of a program can be shown by forms of ap-
proximation, and the three most common forms are abstract interpretation, theorem
proving, and model checking [4]. Hence, if these forms of approximation are used suc-
cessfully with proper validation and verification, then certain assurances are proven
for a given specification and its implementation.
This showcases how formal methods, and the assurances thereof, differ from clas-
sically used approach of tests. In general, formal method proofs differ from unit and
regression testing. Testing does not demonstrate full, proper operations of a system
other than for the specific cases under test [7]. In particular, testing shows the result
for a specific input, while a formal proof shows a general result for an entire class
of inputs [8]. These general results are possible for formal methods because they
model a system’s operations with a rigorous mathematical representation [4]. Thus,
in attempts to secure a system or ensure security property design, then the benefits
of formal methods greatly exceed those of simple unit tests.
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An Example Approach in Formal Validation: Functional Program-
ming Language Prototypes
To assure security properties via validation, a proof engineer needs to take care
in their claims with respect to the semantics of a program. A common practice for
software design is the construction of a prototype. If an imperative programming
language is used, then the specification will a state-based implementation. Such an
implementation has inputs that modify its state, and the implementation may have
non-deterministic execution (i.e., the behavior of such a program depends on both
the current inputs and the state resulting from execution on past inputs). As such,
to ensure that mathematical analysis and program determinism is as practical as
possible, a functional programming language should be considered over an imperative
programing language implementation.
Functional programming languages process inputs to produce an output. There
are two major implementations of functional programming languages: pure and im-
pure languages. Pure languages are seemingly the ideal case of computer execution
of an algorithm (i.e., a step-wise and defined set of logic or math is applied to inputs
that result in outputs). However, actual software programs typically have “effects,”
which can be actions such as: a global state, exception handling, non-deterministic
type outputs, assignments, and continuations [9]. This is where impure functional
programming languages have been created, since these languages allow for effects to
be implemented on top of the functional programming language features [9]. Typ-
ically, impure functional programming languages are realized with the addition of
“monads” (i.e., monads allow functional languages to include and account for pro-
gram effects) [10]. For example, a program that reaches a halting state (e.g., an
exception handling of a calculation that was produced from a division by zero or the
resulted as “not a number”) would result from monad exception handling. Monads
8
can also give a uniform framework for program development [10].
In order to leverage monads for larger claims, and for prototyping with function-
al languages, a team from the National ICT Australia (NICTA) Limited showed a
method to validate their monadic design with a proof script that was validated by a
larger proof assistant tool [11]. The team leveraged a set of mathematical techniques
known as Hoare Logic. Applied Hoare Logic is used to evaluate and validate Hoare
Triples, which are comprised of an assertion of the state of the code before execution
(i.e., the precondition), the code fragment (i.e., the algorithm to manipulate data),
and an assertion of the state after execution of the code fragment (i.e., the post-
condition) [12]. The Hoare Triple enables a method to define code that is modeled
and bounded to assure the code fragment’s execution. They are the foundation for
the calculus and rules of operation for specific actions or code assignments that are
proven valid or invalid [12]. The features of the seL4 team’s monad, were validated
with Hoare Logic, to validate the team’s claims regarding the security of their system
under test [11]. Formal methods usually try to prove a base case and build upon
proof of work. The NICTA team showed that their monad was correct and then used
it for functional language prototypes to enable security properties [11].
Survey of Formal Verification Tools & Projects
Formal Verification Projects and Tools
The literature described a significant number of formal verification projects. Chong,
et al., provided a detailed list and examples reviewing numerous projects, and the
most relevant of these projects and tools are shown in Table 1 [13].
Table 2 lists a representative range of tools used in formal verification such as
proof assistants and model checkers. Many tools were found based off the work by
Chong, et al., but the work of Armstrong, et al., greatly expanded the total identified
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Table 1. A Selected List of Formal Verification Projects and Applications
Project Name Features
seL4 A formally verified L4 microkernel that runs on ARMv6/v7 and x86 processors
CertiKOS Certified concurrent, general purpose operating kernels
ExpressOS A mobile OS enabling high assurance applications with formal methods proven security invariants
MinVisor A Type-I x86 hypervisor with proven protection properties at the assembly level using ACL2
Rocksalt Software-based fault isolation, as used in Google Chrome’s Native Client
Jitk In-kernel interpreters; native instruction execution of compiled user-space policies
FSCQ First file system with a machine-checkable proof which its proven specification includes crashes
XMHF A modular, high performance hypervisor framework with automated verification
Verve An Operating system verified with typed assembly language and Hoare logic
formal verification tools [14]. The tools included cover hardware, software, and general
system modeling.
Two specific tools have been foundational in this research: Isabelle and KLEE.
Isabelle
The NICTA effort, to leveraging Hoare Logic to prove and validate monad design,
was implemented with Isar. Isar is a modeling and “proving” language that allows for
creation of theorems understandable by both humans and computers (i.e., the theorem
that is created can be read directly from Isar source files and be understood) [15].
Such a language allows the creation of lemmas and theorems for a system as a set
of theory files (i.e., mathematical representations can be made of designed logic and
assumptions). Constructed theories can then be mathematically proven to be true
or false by the proof-assistant environment Isabelle/HOL, commonly referred to as
Isabelle. Describing these theories in Isar allows for higher-order logic to be used as
a logical calculus for validation efforts [15]. The NICTA team used Isar to capture
and represent their monads under test, saved their theory files in an Isar format, and
used Isabelle to validate their designs. This technique is representative of the theorem
proving form approximation referred to by Schmeelk.
10
Table 2. A Selected List of Formal Verification Tools and Methods
Application Name Platform Features
Alloy Java A language and tool that evaluates structures by reduction to SAT
BLAST Linux A Model Checking Tool for C Programs
CacheAudit OCaml on Linux and Mac Static analysis tool for cache side-channels
Caisson VHDL/Hardware Design Its a provably secure HDL that is converted to Verilog
CMBC Windows, Linux, Mac A C/C++ Bounded Model Checker
CertiCrypt The Coq Proof Assistant A cryptographic proof assistant
CertiPriv The Coq Proof Assistant A reasoning framework for differential privacy
Code-Pointer Integrity LLVM It assures program code pointer integrity
Cryptol Windows, Linux, Mac A programming language for cryptographic algorithms
CryptoVerif OCaml Automated security protocol assurance
DJoin N/A Differential reasoning to process distributed database queries
DFuzz OCaml A differential privacy type checker
EasyCrypt OCaml A cryptographic proof assistant
Facebook Infer Linux and Mac A Static analysis tool for C, C++, Java and Android
FDR/FDR2 Windows, Linux, Mac A model checker based on communicating sequential processes
Frama-C Windows, Linux, Mac, FreeBSD Program analyzers for C
GUPT N/A A tool for guarantying differentially private systems
GLIFT N/A Tools for analysis, statically verification, and controlling information-flows
Incisive N/A Hardware, at a gate level, safety policy simulator
Isabelle/HOL Windows, Linux, Mac A generic proof assistant using Isar proof script
JasperGold Incisive Functional checker and debugger for register-transfer level hardware
Java Pathfinder Java An execution environment for bytecode verification
KCoFI N/A A system to ensure control-flow integrity protections
KCoFI N/A A system to ensure control-flow integrity protections
KLEE N/A Analysis framework for LLVM-IR to symbolically execute C/C++ Code
NuSMV (and SMV) Windows, Linux, Mac An open architecture for model checking
Pinq Windows Reasoning tools for differential privacy properties
Questa Formal Verification N/A Hardware simulator to determine behaviors and error states
rF* F* A cryptographic security proof verification system based on refinement types
Sapper N/A A hardware description language for security-critical designs
SC-Sniffer N/A A side-channel leak analysis tool
SecVerilog Linux A hardware description for information flow reasoning
Simulink Design Verifier Simulink Dynamic and static analysis for model error detection
SPARk Ada An Ada based language and set of tools to ensure software integrity
Spin Promela A promela interpreter that generates C code for model checking
SVA LLVM A virtual operating system for analysis and modeling of software
UPPAAL Windows, Linux, Mac A real-time system modeler via timed automata
VDM N/A Vienna Development Method: a set of methods and tools for formal reasoning
KLEE
According to Schmeelk, common methods of abstract interpretation include: de-
cision tables, symbolic execution, static and dynamic code analysis, and border-line
informal methods [4]. The method most relevant to this research is symbolic execu-
tion. According to King, symbolic execution focuses on supplying symbols instead of
the normal inputs for a program, and the execution proceeds normally with symbolic
formulas over the input symbols [16]. The advantage of symbolic execution for a pro-
gram is a set of inputs is symbolically executed, and these inputs may be equivalent
to a large number of normal test cases [16]. Furthermore, the results of symbolic
execution can be checked for correctness either formally or informally [16]. One such
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approach is to use a language independent intermediate code representation. This
provides a means to determine the states and pathways of execution independent of
the original source code.
One intermediate representation is LLVM Intermediate Representation (LLVM-
IR), which is widely used for formal analysis [17]. One tool based on LLVM-IR
is KLEE, which uses symbolic execution to generate test inputs. KLEE includes a
symbolic library into a C program under test, and then compiles the result to an
LLVM-IR format. KLEE then uses built-in heuristics to test the symbolic space and
determine program semantics. Tools such as KLEE allow proof engineers to test
implementations of their validated theories, thereby providing a holistic approach to
testing.
Using seL4 as a Model System and Approach
The seL4 microkernel, created by the Software Systems Research Group at NIC-
TA, now Trustworthy Systems at Data61, has a validated design and verified imple-
mentation [18][19]. The group has since released tools and published techniques to
allow continued development of seL4 and its applications. The development process
is focused on the use of automated tools in the formal analysis and kernel prototyp-
ing of an L4 microkernel. The design, proposed by Jochen Liedtke, embodies the
functional design of microkernels: the kernel provides a set of general mechanisms
while user-mode servers implement the actual OS services [20]. A new framework
was created on top of the verified kernel to enable assured application development.
This framework extends the secure base of the kernel to allow developers to build
upon the proven work and designs of seL4. Such a capability can drastically reduce
the effort needed to assure new features and designs.
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An Observation of a Formal Methods Process
Klein, et al., showed that assurance is achievable with formal machine-checked
verification, such that mathematical proof and implementation is consistent with its
specification and free from programmer-induced implementation defects [19]. The
seL4 team used a refinement proof to establish a correspondence between high-
level/abstract and a low-level/concrete representation of a system. The correspon-
dence proof ensures logic (specifically Hoare logic) properties of the abstract model
also hold for the low-level representation [19]. This implies that if a security proper-
ty is proved (in Hoare logic) about the abstract model, then refinement guarantees
the same property holds for the implementation source code [19]. As the seL4 team
pointed out the source code would still need to be validated to ensure it meets the
code representation [19]. Hence, a given design for an abstract theory could be input
to an automated tool to prove its properties are valid, which allows for guarantees
regarding the source code representation/implementation. It is observed that de-
sired theoretical properties can have their design validated leading to verification of
an implemented specification. Modeling these techniques allows for a standardized
approach to formal methods.
Leveraging Automated Tools in Design Validation
One may assume that in order to solve proofs the only method is to directly
solve and leverage a proof assistant’s primary language/scripting language. When
delving into the methodology of the seL4 project it was discovered that the team
did not directly, and solely, leverage Isabelle, via Isar proof script, to design
the microkernel. Instead the team leveraged the functional language of Haskell for
prototyping. The team showed how Haskell can be generated to Isar script, which
allows verification by Isabelle [21]. As the team once discussed: “Given the precise
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semantics of the Haskell language, and the lack of side-effects of functional languages
in general, it is a much simpler task to extract a formal model of the kernel compared
to typical low-level systems languages like C” [21].
Subsequently, the Haskell implementation allowed for the automated generation of
into Isar, documentation with LaTeX, and a compiled Kernel Prototype via the GHC
(Haskell) compiler. The combination and relative ease of simultaneous development
likely drove the usage of this process for the seL4 teams. Additionally, the ability
to “code” and design in Haskell, with the code converting to Isar for Isabelle
processing was likely a huge motivation due to the complexity of proof design and
verification. The process allowed kernel properties to be achieved through functional
programming implementation, and gave both the means to verify its model with
Isabelle while additionally providing a prototype of the theory in a generated,
binary form. Figure 2 shows the overall approach of the seL4 design process.
Figure 2. The Design Process for the seL4 Microkernel
The investigation into such tools and methods does not preclude the identification
and application of other non-Isabelle tools. The intention of modeling a formal pro-
cess after seL4 is to follow a known format or approach as to gain familiarity with the
topics, which ultimately can help inform and decide on an appropriate approach for
Android. Currently, no automated Haskell to Isar tools allow a Haskell implementa-
tion to be converted for analysis verification. As previously discussed, the seL4 team
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used Haskell to Isar theory files, and both are included in the GitHub.com hosted
repository. It was not determined if the Haskell conversion scripts were included in
the repository. Yet, if they were it is likely they are too specific, with respect to
the seL4 source implementation, to use generically for other cases. (i.e., no clear
documentation was found that showed the generation of Haskell to Isar theory files).
A seL4 Proving Environment with Docker
In May 2017 the seL4 follow-on team at Data61 released a new process to enable
rapid deployment of a seL4S development environment. The process focused on a
step-by-step tutorial on Linux that enables and executes Docker-based repositories.
These repositories, once started, self deploy and setup the remainder of the tools and
environment configurations for seL4 development. Additionally, this environment
grabs the seL4 source files, and these are then used to execute and run the proof
scripts and tools. These tests allow developers to directly access and examine the
methods and sources for both projects, which then can be validated or extended to
create new seL4-based applications.
Ultimately, the goal of this build-environment was to abstract the tool and isolate
the programs from the host machine (i.e., OS updates and changes do not impact
the development environment), and to allow the direct control and restriction of
dependencies for the build environment [22]. A side-effect from the change in the
seL4 development environment was the ability to rapidly and consistently deploy a
development environment that was shared to the community. Instructions provided
by Mondy can be easily followed to create a new Docker container with all needed
development tools for seL4 [22].
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The Use of Haskell Prototypes and Haskabelle in seL4
The seL4 team leveraged Haskell as a method to implement their theory into
an executable format. Klein stated that Haskell was leveraged in part to translate a
prototype of the kernel into Isabelle and to prove a large number of invariants and
theorems [23]. In this method a specific and desired security feature or even prototype
was implemented, converted, and subsequently proven in Isabelle. This implies
that for such a method to be leveraged for A2E2, then each individual property
needs to follow a similar methodology. This could be achieved, but a great need for
familiarly with both Haskell and Isabelle are a requirement for the individual or
team attempting to prove the A2E2 security properties. Evidence for such a tedious
process was documented by Haftmann, one of the seL4 team engineers/developers,
since it was stated that there is a constant need in developing ad-hoc conversion scripts
that fit to a very specific setting [24]. However, this main approach of leveraging
Haskell, converting into Isar, and proving the design with Isabelle was the main
approach taken by the seL4 team.
However, Haftmann describes that Isabelle could generate Haskell, but it may
be desired for Haskell to be generated into Isabelle-readable content instead, and one
of methods in which to achieve this is with Haskabelle [24]. As the amalgamation
of the name implies, the Haskabelle tool works by converting Haskell source code
into Isar proof script (as stored in .thy files). As of 2010 the seL4 team had not been
using Haskabelle, since they had constructed their own tool(s) to translate their
Haskell implementation into an Isabelle readable format [23]. Around this time
the seL4 team had seen promising experiments to indicate Haskabelle might be
useful to Isabelle users, and had proposed two types of approaches: 1) program
in Haskell, import into Isar theories for Isabelle, and prove the desired properties,
and 2) a one-time import of an existing Haskell project into Isar, develop in Isar,
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and as needed produce Haskell using the built in Isabelle code generator [24]. In
effect the seL4 team had identified or used two types of approaches: a direct Haskell
to Isabelle procedure, and recommended Haskell to Haskabelle to Isabelle
method. Therefore, to potentially leverage the proven security properties of the seL4
Kernel, while following an accepted security design with formal methods, the usage of
Haskabelle in conjunction with Isabelle is reviewed when approaching theory
design and verification. Each approach was deemed as a having potential interest as
to applicability to this research and shall be expanded upon in Chapter 3.
II.2 Software Containment
Isolation and containment of software is not a new idea, and has been proposed in a
variety of mediums over the past sixty years [25][26][27][28]. Examples of containment
also include: the tool change root or chroot, virtual machines with type 1 (runs in
an operation system) and type 2 (runs directly on hardware) hypervisors, and Linux
Containers (LXC) including Docker [29]. Typically an operating system acts as the
host, and software applications run identically (as they would on the host operating
system) within a container.
Another example of containment is with a software container, since it is a complete
runtime environment that supports runtime execution (i.e., the applications, depen-
dencies, and other required binaries and configuration files are collected in a single
execution space) [30]. A container has no knowledge of any processes or applications
out side of its runtime, and everything the application(s) within the container need
are also housed inside the container [31]. Containers that allow a direct virtualization
of applications are referred to as operating system virtualization, and these types of
isolation software are commonly referred to as containers [29]. Containers typically
do not fully virtualize a full operating system, and will be a clone or instantiation
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of a portion of the host machine; this is one factor that separates a container from
a virtual machine, since virtual machines are fully contained operating systems that
are controlled with a hypervisor.
Many containment solutions have software that runs on top of the host operating
system with varying levels of isolation. This isolation could be accomplished for
numerous reasons, but commonly include allowing scalability of applications (e.g.,
cloud computing), protecting both running applications from one another and keeping
the operating system away from harmful applications (e.g., crashes, exceptions, and
even malicious applications). Advantages of ensuring safe and reliable execution
has been documented by Amazon Web Services engineers the importance of formal
specification and model checking [32]. Yet, it appears that there is no major or
commercial product for containment that has been developed with formal methods.
Containers vs. Sandboxes
There are varying levels of isolation of software from its host, and a related form
of software isolation is an application sandbox. The isolation techniques for many
containerization solutions are based on: access controls, logical separation of the root
directory with a chroot-like mechanism, Docker, and virtualization (e.g., VirtualBox,
Amazon Web Services) [33].
Sandboxes, like containers, attempt to control the flow and impact of its controlled
software on a host machine; for instance a sandbox would be used to control the safe
crashing of its software or reduce the ability of its software from deadlocking the host
machine like a container. Yet, sandboxes differ from containers, since a container seeks
to have all needed runtime files in the same location of the isolated software, and a
sandbox usually allows access to files directly on the host machine. Also, the software
within the sandbox could still have unrestricted access to the rest of the system
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similar to a standard, host machine program (i.e., sandboxed applications can still
access other locations and data on the host machine). Commonly, sandboxed software
does not include or copy all files required files for its run time in an isolated space. In
effect, a container is a more restrictive and isolating sandbox, since containers want
to prevent most dependencies from and access to the host machine.
Current Containment Solutions
Various approaches have been presented to solve the problem of containing and
securing software execution [34][35][36][37][38][39]. Over this period of research many
solutions have been found, so a list of current containment solutions was collected
relating to operating system level containment. Table 3 details containers and features
of their containment.
Table 3. A Selected List of Containment Technologies
Application Name Features
ARMlock ARM processors use of memory domain support to create sandboxes
ARMor Dynamically translation of code to execute on hardware implementing different memory modes
Boxify Non-modifying Android App Encapsulation
Capsicum A lightweight OS capability and sandbox framework for FreeBSD
Docker OS-level application containment and virtualization on Windows/Linux/OSX
Inktag Hypervisor; access controls, system crash recoverability
Linux-VServer Virtual private server that securely partition resources on a Linux
LXC Operating System-level virtualization that enabled multiple, concurrent Linux systems
MBOX A sandbox mechanism to control host file system access and system call invocations
MiniBox An x86 sandbox that protects the OS and sandboxed application
OpenVZ A Linux-only virtualization system running a specific kernel
PREC Android system call isolation to protect root exploitation
TxBox Parallelized, speculative execution of untrusted applications
Vx32 Application-level virtual machine to run applications at a user-mode level
Current Containment Solutions Lack Assurance
Modern programs and applications have been created with good design processes
and practices, which enforce desired boundaries of execution. Based on review of
current literature no current containerization solutions have formally proven security
properties, so there is no formal assurance of their specification or designs. At this
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time none of the solutions in Table 3 use of formal methods for either the design or
their implementation. The lack of formal methods implies there is no proof that all
discrete,possible states (or even the majority of states) of desired code execution are
enforced or bounded (i.e., only specific unit and regression tests have been applied
as opposed to general classes of solution). Additionally, the lack of formal methods
implies the true assurance of security for the application cannot be determined, since
the program is not mathematically proven and validated for a specification. This is an
important fact to acknowledge, because if claims are made for the security of software
they also must be paired with heavy caveats to the conditions and environment in
which the program executes. Interestingly, this common lack of assurance was pointed
out by researchers twenty years ago, because they were seeking to understand how
software became as reliable as it is without having formally proven designs [40].
Using Docker as a Model System and Approach
Docker is container product that is mainly used on Desktop and Server personal
computers, and is created by Docker Incorporated. It is open source software hosted
on GitHub, which allows for the tool to be analyzed, reviewed, and even modified.
There is no direct port of Docker that runs on Android, and this is likely due to the
fact that most applied uses of Docker are command-line-based applications. At this
time the software product is not formally assured, so there are not direct assurance
capabilities for the present research to leverage. However, this research considers
how Docker provides isolation as a model to support the requirements definition of
an assured container, since the containment and isolation that Docker leverages are
potentially useful on Android.
A close comparison of how Docker implements a containers is the tool Chroot.
Docker and Chroot are implemented in different programming languages, but both
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appear to leverage the Linux Kernel to implement permissions. Docker appears to
provide many features to support isolation, but the company also states that these
features are at a high-level and specifics are not documented [41].
When looking into some of Docker isolation techniques it was discovered that the
tool uses a combination of LXC (Linux Container) or runC (a command line tool based
on the OpenContainer specifications), and the Advanced Multi-layered Unification
Filesystem (AuFS) tools to achieve its containerization goals [42]. The specifics to
how each of the tools are leveraged is not covered in this research; a simpler goal
of general isolation methods is being sought as opposed to implementation specific
designs for containers. Docker features many low-level activities specific to the OS
(e.g., permission enforcement with the Linux Kernel), since many of the higher-level
capabilities focus on user interaction with Docker and configuration management of
Docker containers (e.g., container provisioning and records management). It can be
argued that the primary tool to enable low-level activities in Docker was LXC (i.e.,
Docker was eventually migrated from LXC to runC due to architectural and open
standard issues versus capability concerns [42]). LXC technologies and features were
found to be the utilized as an interface and collection of applications for containment
with the Linux Kernel. The use of LXC and the Linux Kernel was described by
Moser, which included Linux features of: kernel namespaces, Apparmor & SELinux
profiles, kernel functionality (e.g, sys boot, sys chroot, sys module, net bind service,
and sys mknod), control groups / cgroups, Chroot jails, and seccomp policies [43].
These features are of the utmost interest, since they appear to parallel the focus of
Android security concerns.
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The Go Programming Language
Docker is implemented in the Go programming language, and there are develop-
ment tools that allow the creation of Go programs for Android. The Go Programming
Language (Golang) is considered a new programming language since it was created
in 2007 with an open source version being released in 2009 [44]. Version 1.0.0 was re-
leased in 2012 and many new versions and updates are being consistently released [45].
Yet, the primary focus of this programming language is for application development
on desktop and server environments.
Thus, if a Go container would need root level accesses, then it is probable the
container would prevented from executing on Android due to the standard security
model (i.e., all non-Google and non-OEM applications are prevented from root-level
execution). Conceivably, if a container application were to be developed in Go, that
works on Linux, then access levels could be permitted for the container (e.g., if an
OEM were to include it with its packaging, or if a “rooted” device were to execute the
software). Specific runtime issues were not examined in this research, since a focus is
how to assure the specification of security properties and their implementation into
programs as a whole.
An Assured, Docker-like Linux Container Implemented in Golang
There are several examples on-line of creating Linux kernel enforced (i.e., names-
pace) containers, and examples can be found that implement a container in a mini-
mum amount of code and even as in as little as 500 lines of C code [46]. Developers
are claiming to have achieved Linux containers in 100 lines of Go code (i.e., Go as a
higher level language should take less C code to implement). One such example of
a Go container is by Friedman, which was covered by Rice during a 2016 conference
for Container Camp UK [47]. Both versions of the source code can be found on-line,
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and show two slightly different approaches in the implementation of Go for a Linux,
chroot-like container [48][49]. These source files show different settings and config-
urations (e.g., base directories, permissions, etc.), but at the core of both programs
is the use of Linux Kernel features for containment. The simple design is beneficial
since it may reduce any potential issues if such code could be ported to Android.
Additionally, having these example Go implementations of containers as a starting
point may simplify assurance of implementation verification. As previously discussed,
KLEE is a symbolic execution tool, but it focuses on C and C++. Thus, an open
research question forms with the ability of a Go language container to invocate C
and C++ functions, which may allow KLEE to be used for symbolic execution in a
Go container. The successful implementation of KLEE into the development of a Go
container would allow for formal methods to be applied to the implementation of this
software. More details on this approach will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Migrating Go Linux Applications to Android
In July 2014 the first usable “Go Mobile” example (based on a C/Java Native
Interface and logcat) was committed into the main mobile repository for Go. This
suite of tools allows for cross compilation of Go source code to both iOS and Android
devices. The Android versions of the code for Go is compiled to native (usually
Arm-base) machine binaries, which can be executed by the Linux Kernel in Android.
“Go Mobile” offers a means to allow Go development that can easily be ported to
Android, thus if a container was designed with Go it may have the capability to be
ported to the mobile operating system. At this time, however, it is unknown the level
of features and accesses on Android that Go code may execute. On most Android
implementations there are restrictions for the root user and root-level API function
calls. Go has no root-based Linux kernel function restrictions, since an application
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on workstations and servers application would authenticate an application prior to
execution.
The Go Mobile suite of tools allow for Go development in the Android Studio
IDE. With respect to a Go-based coded application for Linux the tool suite “Mobile”
from the experimental go tool chains can be leveraged to allow for cross compilation
of go source code for Android. Due to the complexity of this research only the base
examples included in the Go Mobile code based were tried. The tools allow for code to
be complied into into an Android Package Kit (APK), which can be transferred and
installed on Android. These applications execute similarly to Native Development
Kit that is used to build C-language binaries. Meaning that a user’s Go code can be
built and innovated directly, with message or data passing, as ARM binary file (i.e.,
Go code is built and can be called like a method from a Java-based application), and
the Go code could also be invocated and started without having access to the primary
Android OS features (e.g., intents).
It should be noted that the Go Mobile tools require the NDK to be installed for
Android. This can be done directly from the archived package binaries, or by the
method of the Android SDK Manager. For ease of installation the NDK was installed
with Android Studio, and a path modification for BASH was added for both the bina-
ry folders of Android Studio and the sub-folder for the NDK. Once the development
kits are properly installed and configured the installation of the Go Mobile tools can
be accomplished with the commands of: go getgolang.org/x/mobile/cmd/gomobile
and then gomobile init. At this point a command line environment is established and
configured for Android APK generation. The Go Mobile project includes two main
examples that display simple OpenGL and bind() elements for Android, which can be
modified for use in Go programming implementations. While the core Go library is
functional on Linux there are many instances of API/function calls requiring root for
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proper execution; this is not usually permissible on Android due to the locked-down
nature and permission model. Hence, at this time it is unknown the supportability of
the extended Go library on Android. Additionally, there were attempts at launching
the Go Mobile examples on an unlocked and installed Cyanogenmod ROM of An-
droid, which grants full root-level permissions of an Android device. However, the
Go-based system calls, the Android monkey tool, and the development tool “am”
could not successfully launch function calls at a root level. These attempts included
an integrated version of Rice’s Go container code targeting an SD Card storage de-
vice, but all system calls failed. It is presumed that this was due to the Go containers
needing root permissions, but it the attempts were also unable to print or log any
errors relating to the failed attempts. These attempts are additionally presumed to
fail in due part to the unfamiliarity of leveraging Android permissions along with
the unknown nature of Go code executing within the Android environment. Howev-
er, it should be noted that simple Go applications would execute as expected (e.g.,
computational or database type input/output operations), so to have issues resulting
from low-level permission required activities is not surprising. Thus, if a new means
of userspace containment could be found, or enabled in the Linux kernel, then it is
presumed that a Go container like Rice and Friedman could be implemented.
II.3 Android
Mobile devices (e.g., cellular phones and tablets) are typically not considered to
be a personal computer (i.e., a desktop or laptop) by an average consumer. This is
likely due to the devices having a considerable amount of differing hardware than a
personal computer to miniaturize the devices to allow for portable computing and
cellular phone service. However, a common factor between personal computers and
mobile devices is both types of computers run an operating system. An operating
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system is software that controls and directs the operation of a computer and its
programs [50]. New operating systems have developed over the past few decades to
enable mobile devices as portable computers.
The increasing capability of hardware and batteries gave rise, in 2003, to Android,
Incorporated [51], which sought to develop smarter mobile devices to be more aware of
the owner’s location and preferences [51]. Then in 2005 Google, Inc. bought Android,
Inc., created The Open Handset Alliance in 2007 (focusing on open standards for
mobile phones), and released the first Android Software Development Kit (SDK)
in 2007 as well. Release of the official Android operating system, simply 1.0 [52],
occurred in October 2008 with the near simultaneous release of the operating system’s
source code [53] and the HTC Dream (G1) phone [51]. A continuing theme of Google’s
acquisition and release of Android has been open source code and design, which is
pivotal in the analysis and development of software for devices running the operating
system. In the ten years after the release of the Android SDK the operating system
now has over 2 Billion monthly active devices [2], and in 2017 trends show that
Android, based of web traffic trackers, has taken over the lead from Windows as the
most popular operating system [2].
The Android Security Model
An interesting fact of Android is the central design around the Linux Kernel.
Kernels can be thought of as the brain for an operating system, since kernels direct
the flow and control of internal and external devices and programs. Many security
features on Android relate, or are enabled due, to the Linux kernel. The kernel acts
as a base upon which Android developers have expanded upon to ensure operating
system and subsequently application security. A model of the Android OS can be
seen in Figure 3 showcases the documentation, and most of security is focused at the
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lowest two layers.
Figure 3. The Android Software Stack
This software stack model has not changed much over the duration of Android’s
development, but the implemented security features have been ever evolving over
the past ten years. As new Linux Kernel features are added they are potentially
integrated into Android. Features beyond the Linux kernel appear to come from
the community and core developers of Android that are expanding best practices of
security features. A summary of security features, per major Android Release, can
be found in Appendix B.1.
Android Sandboxing
At the time of this writing there are major shifts planned for Android 8.0 and
beyond. However, the major trend across all of the previously added or planned
improved security features is a continued focus of Kernel-based protections in con-
junction with sandbox containment of application [54]. Android’s main security goal
appears to be to protect the central capabilities of Android’s Linux kernel [55], while
ensuring the applications cannot forcibly interact with other applications nor the
hardware to gain access to the Linux kernel [54]. The configurations and protections
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in place with the kernel allow a focus on making applications run within sandboxed
portions of Android, which prevent the rogue application from harming other applica-
tions, the Android system, or the device itself [55]. Android’s approach to sandboxing,
of both data and code execution, is known as the Android Application Sandbox [56].
A unique feature of Android is the fact it assigns a unique User IDentification (UID)
number to each Android application and runs it as that user in a separate process,
which in turn enables the sandbox to enforce security between applications and the
system at the process level [55]. Again, via Linux kernel features (e.g., user and
group IDs) applications are enforced to a security model extends to native code and
to operating system applications [55]. An interesting note regarding the sandbox
technologies is they provide applications with an expectation of isolation from other
processes on the system which includes root processes and debuggers [57]. Further-
more additional Android best practices include: non-access to data within individual
application data folders (unless via debugging), non-access to memory of applications
(unless via debugging), and devices must not include any application that accesses
data or memory of other applications or processes.
II.4 Existing Security Models and Frameworks
A selection of existing security models and frameworks are leveraged in this re-
search to identify a common set of security properties needed for assurable specifica-
tions. Specifically, the models of the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA)
Triad, The Open Group’s Open Information Security Management Maturity Model
(O-ISM3), the Department of Defense (DoD) Security Requirements as derived from
the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP)
800-53, and an analysis of the Android Application Sandbox’s security features are
leveraged for this research. The combination of these four models have been select-
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ed specifically due to: the general information security practices, commercial usage,
United States security direction, and use on Android. There are many models for
security, but the four selected models appear to have appropriate coverage needed for
general and specific properties needed for a comprehensive security design.
The Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability Triad
A cornerstone in security design has been the CIA Triad, which is comprised of the
cornerstone information security topics of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
These three categories are used to describe general requirements of security design,
and also show the interaction of the synergistic and competing areas. For example if a
system was designed to be confidential then there likely are tradeoffs for availability to
a user; such a tradeoff may have a user needing to login and verify access to a system,
but if the user was unable to verify with the system then the availability of system
access is reduced. These three types of categories are used as a general rule, since there
are no specific metrics or measurable means to verify the impact of a system’s design
choices. Many first order CIA solutions act more as labels for security categories
as opposed to implementable security features, but these solutions still drive first
order design choices for a system’s security design. Also, it should be noted that the
category of availability by itself offers no explicit security features, since availability
is normally a measure or a capability of system up time or accessibility. Therefore
the two main topics of the triad under review are confidentiality and integrity.
There are many classes of security features that could be categorized or applied to
the CIA triad. Security features of interest can derived from the the two main triad
topics; for instance, the security features of data protection (confidentiality), data
transmission (confidentiality) and data assurance (integrity) are usually important to
a secure design. Cryptographic means are leveraged to implement these three security
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features (e.g., cryptographic one-way hashes are used to validate data integrity, and
encryption is used to ensure data protection at rest and when transmitted). Yet, it
should be noted that cryptographic solutions are not the only means to implement
confidentiality and integrity. Access controls, for instance, are very common in the
separation of user spaces and data (e.g., separated user name spaces, file system par-
titioning, and user based permission systems), and these could be used to implement
confidentiality and integrity.
Furthermore, the three existing categories can be extended from the triad to ad-
d more security categories. Two security properties that can be extended into the
CIA Triad are Authenticity and Non-repudiation. Respectively, these two properties
typically focus on adding 1) communications and access verifiability, and 2) system
logging and traceability capabilities. Similar to the previously discussed topics, of
confidentiality and integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation are commonly imple-
mented by cryptological means (e.g., users can be validated with passwords and shared
secrets, and when system resources are accessed a data record could be kept to ensure
the proper access is being maintained). These extended categories offer additional
approaches to ensuring a system’s security properties, but again are more applicable
as labeling mechanisms versus true security properties that are implementable.
The high-level abstraction of CIA Triad lacks explicit security features, and focuses
more on the interplay of the categories. Thus, the CIA Triad lends itself to derive
security properties in prototyping or generating specific security features. However,
to generate security requirements and properties for a design more specific models
are needed for concrete examples and definitions of security properties and features.
30
The Open Group’s Open Information Security Management Maturity
Model
The Open Group sets information technology standards across 500 member orga-
nizations in order to help standardize emerging requirements, establish policies, share
best practices while integrating and facilitating open source technologies [58]. As such
The Open Group has created a technology neutral, and business requirement driven,
set of standards to help address security for information technology. This standard is
the O-ISM3 and it aims to ensure implemented security processes are consistent with
an organization’s business requirements through the identification of relevant security
controls and processes.
O-ISM3 encourages the formal measurement of effectiveness of each security man-
agement process with the identification of four separate process levels. These levels
are 1) Strategic (broad goals, coordination, and provision of resources), 2) Tactical
(design and implementation of the “Information Security Management Systems” spe-
cific goals, and management of resources), 3) Operational (the means to achieve via
technical processes), and 4) Generic (for general management relating to tracking,
implementation, status, etc.); note: these process levels appear to echo military defi-
nitions, but they are not, in fact, the same. The first three process levels seek to take
a large security concept and hone it down to a specific method that is implementable
for an organization. For example the issue of “privacy” at a Strategic level, could
be separated into data privacy for customers and also data privacy for employees at
a Tactical level. Subsequently, the different approaches to privacy for users and em-
ployees would have different implementations at an Operational level (e.g., encrypted
storage for users, and access controls with separate work spaces for the employees).
A way to think about the O-ISM3 is not in terms of raw properties of security and
the means in which to enable the features, but the way to think about the model is
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how to apply something like the CIA Triad to an organization through the method
that is O-ISM3. The Open Group states that the objectives of the standard are to:
provide an approach for creating Information Security Management Systems (ISMSs)
(for the business’s mission and compliance needs), provide an approach for any size
organization, enable a way to optimize investments into information security, enable
continuous improvement of ISMSs using metrics, and enable metric-driven, verifiable
outsourcing of security processes.
As such, the O-ISM3 has real contributions to information security and security
property design, since it emphasizes that any implemented feature can be measured.
Specifically, the model states that a metric is a measurement that can be interpreted
and investigated by comparing it with a series of previous or equipment measurements,
and by improving such a metric the total process has value added [58]. Furthermore,
the model states that when the metrics are used to improve the consistency of the
process, and if variations occur in the metric, and are identified, then the process
metric improves as well. Such metrics include activity (the ISMS’s inputs and out-
puts), scope (how many of the input types are being used), effectiveness/availability
(comparison of fraction of inputs that produce an output), quality (comparison of the
ISMS to an ideal output), load (the budgeted vs. actual consumption of resources),
and efficiency (the load over time) [58]. The specifics of the metrics are left to the
implementer, but it is recommended that SANS, NIST SP 800-55, and ISO/IEC
27004:2009 should be used to design metrics to support security governance [58].
The main contribution of O-ISM3 is the highly detailed list of 45 Processes that
should be considered in the design and implementation of an ISMS. The breakout
for the respective process categories are: 3 Generic Processes, 4 Strategic Manage-
ment Processes, 12 Tactical Management Processes, and 26 Operational Management
Processes. Table 4 is the list of all main, available O-ISM3 Processes.
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Table 4. O-ISM3 Processes
Process Type Process Subcategory Process Name
Generic Knowledge Management
Generic ISMS and Business Audit
Generic ISM Design and Evolution
Strategic Report to Stakeholders
Strategic Coordination
Strategic Define Division of Duties Rules
Strategic Allocate Resources for Information Security
Tactical Report to Strategic Management
Tactical Manage Allocated Resources
Tactical Define Security Targets & Security Objectives
Tactical Service Level Management
Tactical Security Architecture
Tactical Insurance Management
Tactical Personnel Security Background Checks
Tactical Personnel Security Personnel Security existing employees
Tactical Personnel Security Security Personnel Training
Tactical Personnel Security Disciplinary Process
Tactical Personnel Security Security Awareness
Tactical Information Operations
Operational Report to Tactical Management
Operational Security Procurement
Operational Life Cycle Control Inventory Management
Operational Life Cycle Control IT Managed Domain Change Control
Operational Life Cycle Control IT Managed Domain Patching
Operational Life Cycle Control IT Managed Domain Clearing
Operational Life Cycle Control IT Managed Domain Hardening
Operational Life Cycle Control Software Development Life Cycle Control
Operational Life Cycle Control Security Measures Change Control
Operational Life Cycle Control Segmentation and Filtering Management
Operational Life Cycle Control Malware Protection Management
Operational Access and Environmental Control Access Control
Operational Access and Environmental Control User Registration
Operational Access and Environmental Control Physical Environment Protection Management
Operational Access and Environmental Control Physical Environment Protection Program
Operational Availability Control Back-up Management
Operational Availability Control Operations Continuity Management
Operational Availability Control Enhanced Reliability and Availability Management
Operational Availability Control Archiving Management
Operational Testing and Auditing Internal Technical Audit
Operational Testing and Auditing Incident Emulation
Operational Testing and Auditing Information Quality and Compliance Assessment
Operational Monitoring Alerts Monitoring
Operational Monitoring Internal Events Detection and Analysis
Operational Monitoring External Events Detection and Analysis
Operational Incident Handling Handling of Incidents and Near-incidents
Operational Incident Handling Forensics
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The O-ISM3 states that of 16 fundamental processes should be considered essential
to any initial in a top-down implementation [58], which means only some 35% of
the total primary processes are needed for a minimum security perspective. These
processes can be found in Table 5.
Table 5. Down-selected, Essential O-ISM3 Processes
Process Type Process Subcategory Process Name
Generic Knowledge Management
Generic ISM Design and Evolution
Strategic Report to Stakeholders
Strategic Coordination
Strategic Allocate Resources for Information Security
Tactical Report to Strategic Management
Tactical Manage Allocated Resources
Tactical Define Security Targets & Security Objectives
Tactical Service Level Management
Operational Report to Tactical Management
Operational Life Cycle Control IT Managed Domain Patching
Operational Life Cycle Control Segmentation and Filtering Management
Operational Life Cycle Control Malware Protection Management
Operational Access and Environmental Control Access Control
Operational Availability Control Backup Management
Operational Testing and Auditing Information Quality and Compliance Assessment
Department of Defense Security Requirements as Derived from the
NIST SP 800-53
A different approach to security, from commercial enterprises and entities, is be-
ing led by the United States’ Department of Defense with respect for security system
design and implementation. Classically, the Department of Defense places a great
emphasis on Systems Engineering, which has also had a major focus on protection
and security of the system being designed. Analysis of Department of Defense security
requirements is being considered due to the specific environment of security products
from the outset. Additionally, a majority of the documentation and security design
is openly available due to the extremely documented approach of their acquisitions
processes for contracting purposes. Such documentation provides specific, contractu-
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ally motivated, design and development considerations are leveraged in this body of
research.
Before looking at the specific DoD security requirements, a quick review of the
catalysts and origins of Department of Defense processes are discussed. The first rule
setting body for acquisitions in the United States starts with the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations (CFR), which is an annual codification of the general and permanent rules in
the Federal Register from the executive departments and its respective agencies [59].
Within this code there are 50 titles containing a broad range of activities relating to
regulatable activities, and specifically Title 48 is the Federal Acquisition Regulations
System [60]. The basis for all United States Federal acquisitions and contracting
begins with the Federal Acquisition Regulations Systems (FARS) being Chapter 1 in
Title 48. Subsequently modeled after the FARS is Chapter 2 being the Defense Fed-
eral Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which are regulations specific to
military acquisitions for the Department of Defense. Additionally, Chapter 2 is com-
prised of nine sub-chapters (having parts 200-299) and nine appendices, and a specific
sub-chapter of interest to system security properties is subpart 239.71 entitled “Secu-
rity and Privacy for Computer Systems”; the section states it focuses on information
assurance and Privacy Act considerations. Furthermore, the section states that in-
formation security are the measures that protect and defend data entered, processed,
transmitted, stored, retrieved, displayed, or destroyed [61]. According to this portion
of the DFARS, assurance occurs on information systems through ensuring availability,
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation via protection, detec-
tion, and reaction capabilities [61]. Additionally, compliance with the approach is
directed to the sub-organizations of the Department of Defense through the docu-
ments in Table 6, and it should be noted that in 2013 and 2014 a shift of terminology
occurred in the DoD that moved from Information Assurance to Cybersecurity.
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Table 6. DFARS: Required Implementation Documents for Information Assurance
Document Title
The National Security Act
The Clinger-Cohen Act
National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy No. 11
Federal Information Processing Standards
DoD Directive 8500.1, Information Assurance
DoD Instruction 8500.2, Information Assurance Implementation
DoD Directive 8140.01, Cyberspace Workforce Management
DoD Manual 8570.01-M
At first glance the sum total of the regulation aligns the Department of Defense to
leverage the CIA Triad as the base security model for all systems. However, over the
last several years many of the directive documents have be updated or modified from
the focus on “Information Assurance” to that of “Cybersecurity.” This shift is explic-
itly covered in the Department of Defense Instruction 8500.01, which its purpose is to
provide guidance on how to protect and defend Department of Defense information
and information technology. Yet, the most important detail is that a majority of
the 8500.01 is modeled from National Institute of Standards and Technology Special
Publication 800-39 and Committee on National Security Systems Policy 22.
Upon review of both the NIST SP 800-39 and the CNSS Policy 22 it was discovered
that there are yet more driving documents when defining security properties for a
system. The NIST SP 800-39 has listed the publications of 800-37, 800-53, 800-53A,
and 800-30 are the definite series of security standards and guidelines necessary for
managing information security risk [62]. Within this final set of NIST regulating
documents it was discovered that Special Publication 800-53, titled “Recommended
Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,” has included
concrete security properties and implementable means for security. Also, the CNSS
Policy 22 led to the discovery of a synergistic document to the 800-53, which is
the CNSS Report 1253 entitled: “Security Categorization and Control Selection for
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National Security Systems and it states it is modeled after the NIST 800-53. The
intensive trail of regulation investigation resulted in two concrete security property
sources for the Department of Defense: the Security Control Baselines in the CNSS
Report 1253 and the Appendices D through F in the NIST SP 800-53. However, only
the NIST SP 800-53 is considered in evaluating security properties, since the CNSS
report states that it is an extension/implementation based upon the NIST SP 800-53.
Yet, as a side note: if a researcher was curious as to see the mapping or overlay of
NIST security Controls to CIA the Appendix D in CNSS Report 1253 includes tables
indicating this information. Ultimately, The Department of Defense is trying to seek
adequate security for its systems, and security is defined as: protective measures
that are commensurate with the consequences and probability of loss, misuse, or
unauthorized access to, or modification of information [63]. The NIST SP 800-53
protective measures have been placed into 18 major categories with a total of 256
controls, which varying across the main categories [64]. A summary of the categories
and their tallied amounts of controls can be seen in Table 7.
As seen with the O-ISM3, not all of the above categories are implementable into
a direct system, since some of the controls are procedural or information-based only
(e.g, Awareness and Training deal with persons using a system, and Program Man-
agement and Risk Assessment deal with the administration of a system). Also, not
all systems need every single security control, and in-fact the minimum/low-impact
baseline recommended by NIST only covers about 45% of the 256 total controls (see
Table 8).
The specifics on how to categorize a system are not included in this research,
but if desired the information can be found in the FIPS Publication 199. Hence, a
generalization of how to categorize a system could be from extending and applying
the definitions of FIPS 199 system loss: 1) a system is low if loss of CIA could
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Table 7. NIST SP 800-53 Control Categories and Tallied Controls
ID Code Category Amount of Controls
AC Access Control 25
AU Audit and Accountability 16
AT Awareness and Training 5
CM Configuration Management 11
CP Contingency Planning 13
IA Identification and Authentication 11
IR Incident Response 10
MA Maintenance 6
MP Media Protection 8
PS Personnel Security 8
PE Physical and Environmental Protection 20
PL Planning 9
PM Program Management 16
RA Risk Assessment 6
CA Security Assessment and Authorization 9
SC System and Communications Protection 44
SI System and Information Integrity 17
SA System and Services Acquisition 22
Table 8. NIST SP 800-53 Minimum Recommended Security Controls
Desired Security Control Level Recommended Controls Coverage Percent
High-Impact Baseline 170 66.41%
Moderate-Impact Baseline 159 62.11%
Low-Impact Baseline 115 44.92%
be expected to have a limited adverse effect on the organization (the organization
is able to perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is
noticeably reduced), 2) a system is moderate if loss of CIA could be expected to
have a serious adverse effect on the organization (a significant degradation in mission
capability to an extent and duration that the organization is able to perform its
primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is significantly reduced), or
3) system is high if loss of CIA could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic
adverse effect on the organization (a severe degradation in or loss of mission capability
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to an extent and duration that the organization is not able to perform one or more
of its primary functions) [65]. Therefore, with the application of applying minimum
security properties to a container environment, with the absence of administrative
type-controls, can be seen as the of controls in Table 9.
Android Application Sandbox’s Security Features
Finalizing the review of security system properties is a quick overview of Android
Application Sandbox features. This sandbox is applicable to the implementation of
Assured Android Execution Environments, since it appears to provide many desirable
features for a container. Table 10 shows the security properties and features the
Android sandbox currently supports.
Unfortunately, the primary documentation for Android developers, on the Android
source web page, only lists the security features in the previous table. There was no
discovered, detailed analysis for the motivation and designs of the features, nor were
there any formal analysis found on the topic. The specifics for these properties per
major Android release can be seen in Appendix B.1, but the major finding was a
majority of the security features of Android are enabled or enforced by the Linux
Kernel. This information is still useful even with the absence of implementation
specifics, because they still provide the general outline and feature set for Android
security. Thus, with these features rounding out the information the investigation into
potential security properties a final consolidation and mapping of these properties can
occur to help define general security properties.
II.5 Related Research
This section focuses on select research that relates to the overall design and mo-
tivation of this thesis. This previous work helped set the stage of understanding and
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future direction needed for provable security on Android. It should be noted that not
all work is directly referenced or used, but the inclusion of the following research may
be helpful for future researchers with respect to this topic.
Formal Modeling and Reasoning about the Android Security Frame-
work
In 2012 a paper by Armando, et al., was released that reviewed and recommended
a formal model for the Android security framework [66]. The researchers detail the
Android Security Framework, present a formal representation of the framework, and
present a type and effect system [66]. From research relating to formal descriptions
of the Android’s security the paper shows the most detailed modeling and reasoning
for the operating system. This high-level approach strives to describe the features of
Android formally at its different layers across applications and system features [66].
The proposed model was stated to guarantee any possible behavior a platform was to
have at runtime with history expressions (the security-relevant side effects produced
by computations conforming to explicit permissions) [66]. Ultimately, the results were
proposed to be statically analyzable from the model, and the researchers had planned
to verify the security properties in future work [66]. However, as of this writing the
researchers have not released any follow-on work or applications to the Android code
base.
Boxify: Stock Android Application Sandboxing
An extremely relevant paper was published in 2015 by Backes, et al., and it
discusses the means to enable application virtualization and process-based privilege
separation on Android to securely encapsulate untrusted apps in an isolated environ-
ment [67]. The researchers have shown they are avoiding a then common practice of
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application modification, which was used in tools such as Aurasium, I-ARM-Droid,
RetroSkeleton, AppGuard, and DroidForce [67]. The two major motivations for their
approach are the fact that to enable such containment on Android usually involves ex-
tensive modifications to Android and its application framework, and even if the tasks
are accomplished the proposed solutions are rarely adopted by Google or the device
vendors [67]. Thus, to avoid custom Android ROMS (e.g., formerly CyanogenMod
and now Lineage OS) the developers have decided to implement their application
directly on top of the Android Application Framework. The source code is said to
be available by request for academic purposes, and there is a mention of the source
becoming open once a licensing issue was resolved. However, the main page for Boxify
was scraped by Archive.org’s Wayback Machine in December of 2016, and as of a year
later the website still has a forthcoming release of the source code. While seemingly
an ideal candidate and fit for this research there is no concrete support of an open
source license, therefore further research was not completed.
Java-based Implementation Assurance Tools
Going over a single tool, in a single application, is obviously non-inclusive of
all appropriate methods for implementation verification. So far a single tool, and
process, has been showcased for this research, but there were a couple of other tools
that were discovered over this period of research. One of the biggest areas that were
not discussed were the potential usage of Java-based tools and methods. Additionally,
there were other discovered abstract interpreters that were found specific to Android.
Java Abstract Interpreters
It again should be reiterated that Android-based Java, it its resulting bytecode,
are not the same as Oracle Corporation’s Java and bytecode. This implies that
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the application and usage of the same source code results in different outcomes and
likely different means of execution. Nonetheless, giving Java abstract interpreters
a mention lends at least an identification of similar efforts ongoing in the world of
implementation assurance.
Some of the first discovered efforts for assurance in Java execution were seen
in the early 2000s with tools such as Java-MaC [68]. Sadly, over this period there
are few cases of continuous development, and the tools seem to ebb and flow for
popularity and usage. Even with this sporadic development there are at least two
modern approaches to formal assurance on Java with the tools of KeY and Soot.
KeY, or the KeY System, is a formal software tool that has was started in the late
1990s used for the design, implementation, and formal verification for Java [69]. A
main feature of interest is KeY’s Symbolic Execution Debugger, which is an integrated
Eclipse IDE plug-in. This debugger constructs a proof and extracts the symbolic
execution tree from the source code in a fully automatic way [70]. This allows a
Java developer to leverage and utilize a form of abstract interpretation to assure their
design meets the original specification, and if KeY is provided with proof specifications
it can incorporate and validate such logic [70]. At this time there is no indication
that KeY supports Android-based java, but if core features of A2E2 were designed in
non-specific Java code (i.e., only methods and objects that are usable in both Android
and standard Java) then it may be possible to leverage the tool as-is.
Another tool, Soot, may be the most promising candidate for the use of Java-
based implementation analysis. Soot was created as a Java optimization framework,
but overtime the tool has extended to support the analysis, instrumentation, opti-
mization, and visualization of Java (source and bytecode) and Android (bytecode)
applications [71]. The tool has been used for examining permissions, analyzing Dalvik
bytecode, examining call graphs, and even symbolic execution for Android applica-
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tions [72][73][74][75]. This tool seems to be more promising than KeY, since there
is an active community with respect to Android. Time will tell to determine if such
formal methods as abstract interpretation will continue with Soot, but hopefully this
information will help future researchers in this area.
Current Android Interpreters
While there have been attempts at porting Java based capabilities to Android
there also have been efforts to directly develop tools for the Operating System direct-
ly. In 2012 Symdroid is a product of the University of Maryland that was developed
around 2012, and it was designed to be a symbolic executor for Android [76][77]. Un-
fortunately, not much beyond its development and usage for symbolic execution were
discovered since there are no known source code repositories for the tool. However,
it is included to show that such capabilities are in development and by extension of
interest to the formal methods community.
A more promising Android set of tools in development are Android Extension-
s to the Java PathFinder (JPF) tool. Java PathFinder is a NASA tool that
creates a new Java Virtual Machine in which java applications are executed to dis-
cover defects [78]. In recent years there have been efforts to add Android extensions
into JPF, and the most notable extensions are JPF-Android and PathDroid.
JPF-Android is a non-GUI based extension that looks at an application’s logic
with the detection of errors and unwanted behavior [79]. The tool appears to be in
active development, but the specifics of how and what portion of the JPF it leverages
were not determined. Also, the tool PathDroid is another extension of JPF, imple-
ments and emulates the Dalvik bytecode instruction set and virtual machine while
re-using the JPF infrastructure [80]. This tool, based upon the last commits to the
open repository of the code, appears to have stopped development in 2015.
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A survey of Applied Formal Methods with Isabelle
An extremely interesting find was a survey completed by Blanchette and Popes-
cu entitled “Isabelle and Security.” The paper is very short at five pages in length, but
had some forty-one references that detail security proof related work for Isabelle [81].
It was decided to include this work, since its extremely applicable for researchers if
they are looking to potentially use Isabelle as a theorem prover. One of the first
topics and work to be recommended is that of Nipkow and Popescu including a uni-
fied set of security concepts and type systems, which Blanchette and Popescu state
as a simplified set of proofs of correctness [81]. It was discovered by Blanchette and
Popescu that several cryptographic protocols were proven in Isabelle by Paulson
and both shared and public key cryptography means were also proven (by Otway-
REss and Needham-Schroeder respectively) [81]. An already discussed project that
details integrity and data flow enforcement is the work by the seL4 team [81]. Ad-
ditionally, the seL4 team contributed efforts toward access control proofs that can
be found in their l4v verification efforts, and Brucker, et al., worked on the Unified
Policy Framework toward access control [81]. With respect to concurrency assurance
efforts Mantel looked at formal proofs for language-based security, and the efforts of
Nipkow, et al., worked toward applications of multithreading [81]. Unfortunately, no
explicit work was detailed for non-repudiated accounting and journaling, but work
relating to noninterference may be applicable within the works detailed by Blanchette
and Popescu. Blanchette and Popescu provide a source of network security with the
work of Dickmann on network policy verification [81]; also, a non-survey item to be
recommend is that of the Netfilter Iptables Firewall. Finally, with respect to data
and execution flows, as to include information-flows, Mantel created a security driven
input/output framework (i.e., the Modular Assembly Kit for Security) and the tool of
Reliably Secure Software Systems that were formalized with Isabelle. Obviously,
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this select list of tools and features are not totally encompassing of the survey nor of
that of the Isabelle body of work, but these programs may shed insights into the
methods used with Isabelle to assure formal designs.
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Table 9. DFARS: Minimum Security Controls for Safeguarding
Control Type Identifier
Account Management Access Control AC-2
Access Enforcement Access Control AC-3(4)
Information Flow Enforcement Access Control AC-4
Least Privilege Access Control AC-6
Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Access Control AC-7
Session Lock Access Control AC-11(1)
Remote Access Access Control AC-17(2)
Wireless Access Access Control AC-18(1)
Access Control for Mobile Devices Access Control AC-19
Use of External Information Systems Access Control AC-20(1)
Use of External Information Systems Access Control AC-20(2)
Publicly Accessible Content Access Control AC-22
Security Awareness Training Awareness and Training AT-2
Audit Events Audit and Accountability AU-2
Content of Audit Records Audit and Accountability AU-3
Audit Review, Analysis and Reporting Audit and Accountability AU-6(1)
Audit Reduction and Report Generation Audit and Accountability AU-7
Timestamps Audit and Accountability AU-8
Protection of Audit Information Audit and Accountability AU-9
Baseline Configuration Configuration Management CM-2
Configuration Settings Configuration Management CM-6
Least Functionality Configuration Management CM-7
Information System Component Inventory Configuration Management CM-8
Information System Backup Contingency Planning Acquisition CP-9
Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) Identification and Authentication IA-2
Identifier Management Identification and Authentication IA-4
Authenticator Management Identification and Authentication IA-5(1)
Incident Response Training Incident Response Integrity IR-2
Incident Handling Incident Response Integrity IR-4
Incident Monitoring Incident Response Integrity IR-5
Incident Reporting Incident Response Integrity IR-6
Non-local Maintenance Maintenance MA-4(6)
Maintenance Personnel Maintenance MA-5
Timely Maintenance Media Protection Maintenance MA-6
Media Storage Media Protection MP-5
Media Sanitization & Maintenance Media Protection MP-6
Physical Access Authorizations Physical & Environmental PE-2
Physical Access Control Physical & Environmental PE-3
Access Control for Output Devices Physical & Environmental PE-5
Security Authorization Process Program Management PM-10
Vulnerability Scanning Risk Assessment RA-5
Application Partitioning System and Communication Protection SC-2
Information in Shared Resources System and Communication Protection SC-4
Boundary Protection System and Communication Protection SC-7
Transmission Confidentiality System and Communication Protection SC-8(1)
Cryptographic Protection System and Communication Protection SC-13
Collaborative Computing Devices System and Communication Protection SC-15
Protection of Information at Rest System and Communication Protection SC-28
Flaw Remediation System & Information SI-2
Malicious Code Protection System & Information SI-3
Information System Monitoring System & Information SI-4
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Table 10. A List of Current Features of the Android Application Sandbox
Feature or Security Property
Application isolation of data and code execution from other apps
Robust implementations of security functionality (e.g., cryptography, permissions, and secure IPC)
Compiler-level Memory Management security technologies
An enablable encrypted file system
User-granted permissions for access to system features and user data
Application-defined permissions to control application data on a per-app basis
Secure credential authorizations (e.g., authorization tokens over user names/passwords)
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III. Approach and Methodology
Modern threats and the lack of formally assured applications motivate the devel-
opment of a new and assured container for Android. Isolation techniques can be used
to protect host systems against potential threats. The two scenarios needing isola-
tion were previously discussed in Chapter 2, and are the cases of malicious software
on a trusted device and trusted software on a malicious device. The examination
of Android development documentation indicates a form of malicious software iso-
lation is targeted with the Android Application Sandbox, but the openly available
documentation of its isolation mechanisms does not indicate that they are formally
assured. This chapter discusses the planned methodology to design and implement a
formally assured isolation tool on Android, which is referred to as Assured Android
Execution Environments (A2E2). To propose a methodology for the development of
an A2E2 container, this thesis describes and evaluates a method for selecting security
properties, validating a set of properties defined in a specification, and evaluating
existing technologies as verification avenues of a specification implementation.
III.1 Assured Android Execution Environments: Definition and Goals
The phrase “Assured Android Execution Environments” refers to a notional suite
of security tools and applications that have been assured with validation and verifica-
tion with formal methods to provide an Android execution space exhibiting specific
security properties proposed herein. No specific tool or product is uniquely defined as
A2E2. Rather A2E2 it is an umbrella term that covers any product having a validat-
ed specification and verified implementation for Android containment. This research
results as a case study involving the development of a single container product to
inform the general process and tools needed for A2E2.
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One goal for A2E2 is the identification and adoption of an appropriate formal
methods approach given the lack of a de facto standard. This method allows future
A2E2 efforts to proceed in a standardized manner similar to a standard life cycle mod-
el for software (e.g., waterfall, agile, and/or spiral software development). Following
a life cycle process identifies two additional goals for this research: (1) security prop-
erties used for A2E2 requirement definition that can be assured with formal methods,
and (2) identification of applicable formal methods tools for specification validation
and implementation verification. Furthermore, A2E2 efforts are not aimed at devel-
oping new formal method tools. Rather they leverage existing automated tools to
enable rapid specification validation and implementation verification. These goals
provide the starting vector in the approach to create realizable A2E2 products and
methods.
III.2 Determining Methods to Achieve A2E2
Two main areas of research were initially identified when determining distinctive
and practical for an A2E2 container. As previously stated there are no known list of
proven security properties, so A2E2 needed to identify a set of security properties that
could be leveraged in requirement definitions used in a specification (i.e., properties
that can be validated in a specification and verified in an implementation). Once the
set of security properties are established then a specification could be created which
would be implemented in programming language.
However, a standardized approach in the application of using formal methods with
traditional software development techniques was not identified in initial research for
this topic. It was also identified that each security property within the specification
would need individual assurance (i.e., if access control of encrypted data was a require-
ment, then both the access control and encryption would need specification validation
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and implementation verification). This process of assurance led to the identification
of a new formal approach: the Formal Verification Cycle. The Formal Verification
Cycle allows for assurance to be broken into two main stages: (1) validation of a
specification that incorporates desired security properties and (2) verification of an
implementation of the validated specification. The following sections detail an ap-
proach to identifying security properties, discussion of the two main steps for realizing
a software specification and implementation (i.e., leveraging the Formal Verification
Cycle), and the proposed three-stage approach used in this research.
Identifying Security Properties
The first step in achieving a software specification is evaluating, identifying, and
defining system requirements. This is also true when seeking an Android container
with desired set of security properties. A broad set of security properties will need to
be found to begin a process of determining specific and applicable security properties.
Those properties that can be assured, through formal methods, would be then form
a set of general A2E2 security properties. Having an established and assured set
of properties allows for future designs and the current design of a container to be
a subset of properties needed to achieve the larger design security goals. However,
there is not a widely accepted standard for defining what is or isn’t an acceptable set
of security properties in general terms or in specific terms for a software container.
Thus, this research will need to determine a set of acceptable security properties and
time permitting assure each property.
Standardizing A Formal Approach: the Formal Verification Cycle
As shown in Chapter 2 various methods and products fall within the class of formal
method approaches. This previous work has inspired a way to standardize the method
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of approaching formal assurance, which is needed due to the lack of a widely accepted
formal method approach/standard. Most individuals and organizations leveraging
formal methods employ a single set of tools and an approach for assurance, but these
approaches are commonly too specific for general development reuse.
Although some approaches to formal assurance can be replicated or duplicated
for new designs, many instances of the techniques are specific to a particular imple-
mentation. This research demonstrates a new formal process based on work by the
seL4 team be developed that aimed at leveraging existing tools. The team’s process
is modeled as the subprocesses of:
• Individual security property selection
• Security property theory validation to be captured in a specification
• Implementation of the design as source code and verification of the original
specification
This process can be viewed as a three element cycle:
• Validation of the theoretical property (i.e., proving the theory)
• A validated system specification
• Use of the design specification to implement and verify a final software imple-
mentation (i.e., proving the implementation)
This three element approach is referred to hereafter as the “Formal Verification
Cycle.”
The first element of the cycle is broken out as the Theory wedge in Figure 4, and
it consists of the steps of defining system properties that are later used with theorem
proving tools to verify the design. The successful application of a formal method
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Figure 4. The Formal Verification Cycle
(e.g., a proof assistant) results in validation of a selected security property. There is
no product that is generated when successfully completing this process of validation
(i.e., using a formal method like a proof assistant will show the theory as being true or
false), but the validated property is now considered to be captured in a specification.
Hence, the Design wedge in Figure 4 is a breakpoint for applied methods an tools in
the Formal Verification Cycle, since a specification must have successful validation of
a property being correct before an implementation is attempted.
Once the property has been validated, then second half of the Formal Verification
Cycle would continue from the Usage wedge. The use of the validated specification
allows for its implementation in a programming language of choice. Ideally a pro-
gramming language should be selected that has a wide range of formal methods tool
support.
Some programming languages have little to no support, which should drive imple-
mentation language decisions if ignoring other design or motivating factors. However,
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there might be external factors that drive a language selection (e.g., some languages
might be chosen for existing work, targeted device supportability, supported tool
chains, etc. that supersede the lack of formal verification tools), and if such the case
were to occur new tools must be developed or modified to achieve implementation
verification.
After language selection and an implementing of the specification are completed,
then the resulting source code (or in some cases a form of the binary construction) can
be verified with a formal method (e.g., models or abstract interpreters) to show the
original security properties hold. Once a property has been successfully implemented,
then all other properties could follow this cycle until all system requirements and
security properties are implemented. Ultimately, this cycle illustrates how to verify
an implementation of security properties built from the validated specification of
the system. Many different tools and programming languages can be used, and this
research does not propose the specific tools. However, future research may recommend
tools based on best practices and ease of use.
The Formal Verification Cycle Identifies Three Distinct Issues
A specific approach is needed to define the methods, establish validity, and deter-
mine both applicable and non-applicable tools for use of A2E2 products. As previous-
ly mentioned the approach will start with the identification and selection of security
properties that can meet the requirements of desired security features. Yet, an im-
portant discovery from using the Formal Verification Cycle is the establishment of
two stages: security property theory validation with theorem proving, and implemen-
tation verification with model checking or abstract interpretation. This showed that
A2E2 could be approached in three main stages to support the end task of imple-
menting a container. The following section looks at each of these stages, and defines
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the approach in validation and implementation of an A2E2 container specification.
III.3 A2E2’s Three-Stage Approach
As previously discussed, the approach of an A2E2 container design is in three ma-
jor stages. The first stage identifies appropriate security property requirements, from
an analysis of existing security frameworks and models, to propose a set of A2E2
security properties. The second stage focuses on a methods of validating security
properties, with a theorem proving tool, to allow the creation of a validated specifica-
tion. Lastly, the third stage evaluates a method of verifying software implementation
with a symbolic execution tool (i.e., an abstract interpretation tool that leverages
symbolic execution). The following sections detail the approaches for each of the
three stages, and the resulting findings for each approach is detailed in Chapter 5.
Defining System Security Properties
To design and assure proper security properties for an A2E2 container a set of
larger security features must be defined. The surveyed models represent best practices
produced by subject matter expert committees and groups over time and are assumed
here to have real world significance. Specifically, four models were surveyed, having
various levels of implementation (i.e., conceptual design versus practical software
implementation), and these were analyzed to create a final set of security properties.
The four models were not developed using with formal methods, but will act as
the baseline for assurable security properties (i.e., properties that can be validated
with a formal method). A consolidation will occur of the properties identified in the
models to obtain a subset consisting of the properties potentially relevant to A2E2.
After assurance of the properties then these are assumed to be valid for all subsequent
A2E2 designs.
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The security properties consolidated from the four models facilitate the definition
of A2E2 System Security Properties. This process starts with the models discussed
in Chapter 2, and mapping of the models’ security properties to a single set for
A2E2 (i.e., a non-duplicated set of properties will be defined if the four models show
overlapping properties). This mapping starts at a general class of security prop-
erties , and applicable properties are selected based on the ability of the property
to be implemented as source code (i.e., invalid and non-included security properties
are commonly processes, activities, or in-person actions). Upon completion of the
mapping activities a final set of security properties, for use across the class of A2E2
products, are recommended as a final of container security properties.
Security Property Validation
Once the selected set of security properties are chosen, then security property
validation can be performed. It was decided that theorem proving would be leveraged
to achieve property validation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the seL4 team leveraged
Haskell (and proposed the tool of Haskabelle) to prototype and assure security
properties. The tool of Haskabelle was selected to achieve the goal of tool reuse.
The research aims to identify the method to setup, use, implement, and validate a
Haskell-coded prototype. After the creation of a development environment, a simple
use case of using Haskabelle showed a conversion of Haskell to Isar proof script.
Proving the Isar script was accomplished with the Isabelle theorem proving tool. The
tool and the process was selected since it includes a version of Haskabelle and the
theorem proving tools needed for theory assurance of Isar script.
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Implementation Verification
The final stage in this research is the verification of a programing language im-
plementation. At this stage the proverbial rubber means the road, since the focus is
real-world source code development that generates a usable software product. At the
outset of the research it was unknown if any security property would be determined to
be assured with theorem proving or with Haskabelle. The complexity of container
development, lack of a final assured design, and unknown state of verification of the
design theory prohibits a real-world solution for this research.
However, an approach was created that was independent of the theorem proving
approach to showcase methods that are integrated into the workflow of a future
A2E2 solution. It was determined that the Go language would be used based on the
modeling of Docker, existing Go language developments (e.g., example containers, go
mobile, and gollvm), and the symbolic execution tool KLEE.
Over the period of this research there was no identification of any formal method
tools for the Go language. However, new advances in the generation of Golang source
code and the tool “gollvm” showed that LLVM-IR could be generated from Go code.
Thus, the intention of the research focused on method or modifications needed to show
how KLEE could be integrated to evaluate Go-based LLVM-IR. If such a process was
created, then it allows for the verification of a Go implemented container based on
the existing example.
This research focused on first getting the Linux-based Go containers to compile
(i.e., it was assumed if the container work on Linux then the gomobile tool could
have a modified version built for Android). The second part focused on creating a
KLEE development environment and showing an example implementation could be
symbolically executed. Lastly, the final design of implementation verification focused
on using KLEE to symbolic the Linux-based Go container implementation.
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III.4 Assumptions and Limitations
When applying a mathematical model to a set of semantic actions there is a
set of caveats and assumptions that are made. Due to the nature of logic proving,
and mathematical representations thereof, there are issues that relate to how refined
a representation can be. Additionally, when trying to prove security-related topics
there needs to be a “build-up” approach (i.e., the smallest, most refined, unit is
proven to be valid, and is proven up to less refined abstractions, which ultimately
shows the whole approach is valid). This may not always be possible, and likely it is
the case that a design is only be partially or specifically proven. This section seeks
to highlight some of the relating issues for caveats and assumption of Android with
respect to planned approach for A2E2.
Assumptions in A2E2
There are practical limits in the computation and verifiability for software prod-
ucts. Since A2E2 products are constructed as software, then they too inherit these
limitations of computability. Therefore, all A2E2 proofs and approaches are bound-
ed by the best practices or limitations of the respective tools used in design and
implementation. Specific issues, if they arise, are annotated with respect to their
identification within the results and conclusions portions of this research.
Additionally, a step toward realizable A2E2 instances is avoiding the re-validation
or re-proving of results found in existing research. For example: if a tool or model
exists, such as formal verification of the construction and execution of source code,
then this research accepts the current issues and limitations for the defined tools and
methods. It has been deemed out of scope to re-work efforts of existing products and
tools, because this research shall assume existing approaches are valid to help ensure
new forms of assurance. Additionally, existing tools integration or modification shall
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be considered valid if using such a tool as a module or if the tool is invoked to perform
an analysis (i.e., the proof to assure and validate new tools or integrations thereof
exceeds available resources of time and effort). If there are questionable issues in the
quality or capabilities for chosen tools or methods, then these also are indicated in
the results and conclusions section of this thesis.
Limitations in A2E2
One concern with formal verification is as it relates to “a formal supply chain.”
Ideally, total product assurance can only be realized when all portions of the system
are formally assured with validation and verification via formal methods. This is
not possible on Android, currently, since the hardware, operating system, nor its
development tools are publicly formally assured. Knowing these facts, a truly formal
solution cannot be presented in this research, since only a portion of the “formal
supply chain” is being investigated. However, this research is looking to advance
the general direction and topic of formal methods/formal assurance to enhance the
security posture on Android.
Another major consideration for the research is the fact that assurance on An-
droid is being approached as a high-level topic as opposed to specific implementation
details with respect to the Android API and Framework. Given the complexity, im-
matureness, and magnitude of this work, the focus of the research is looking at broad
classes of issues for assurance on Android. Thus, any proposed solutions are unable
to delve into Android implementation specifics (e.g., coding API or compiler levels
of issues). For instance: there are specific implementations in Android for encryp-
tion, but this research is not currently looking at the validity or assurance of this
encryption as valid or not. At this point in A2E2 research, the focus is to enable and
validate encryption as a security property, which is different than arguing the merits
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of Android’s implementation of one standard versus another.
III.5 Expected Outcomes
At the outset of this research it was idealized that a singular and usable Assured
Android container be developed or prototyped. Yet, with cursory research it was
shown that this idealized state is impossible to be met for various reasons (e.g., ex-
tensive work for a single researcher, untested tools, lack of knowledge for functional
programming verification, ). The first and most important outcome for this research
is a list of general security properties for the design and implementation of a secure
design. Due to the lack of standards and accepted practices there is a need for a set of
discovered or consensus-based security properties. This set of properties may be used
in down-selections to pick specific and applicable A2E2 security properties. The find-
ings from the security properties identification would then allow for the determination
of tools and techniques of relating to both the proving of the formal specification and
implementation. It is noted that there is no predicable amount of tools, techniques,
or methods that are applicable to A2E2 work, so only the results to the analyzed and
leveraged tool will be included.
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IV. Results and Findings
The results and conclusions of the research herein directly relate to the outlined
approach in Chapter 3. This three stage approach deals with: A2E2 security prop-
erties identification, validating security properties in a specification, and verifying a
software implementation. The specific reference materials and stage-related content
can be found in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
IV.1 Identified A2E2 Security Properties
A standardized set of security properties can be created from an evaluation of
existing models and frameworks as discussed in Chapter 2. A key action is the
consolidation of similar and overlapping properties that exist between the models
and standards. These consolidated properties are proposed as the standard for A2E2
security properties.
Mapping Security Properties to a Single Model or Framework
Native and validated security properties are being identified for A2E2 to help sim-
plify future assurance in software products. Each of the four models discussed in
Chapter 2 are evaluated to support a consolidated list of native properties for A2E2,
and the final identified set will be the result of consolidating the properties that may
be validated. Validation of the properties is not executed at this stage, but a focus
is given to the possibility of each property being implementable or not; for instance,
it is important to have confidentiality from the CIA Triad, but confidentiality is not
implementable where as cryptography is implementable and would achieve such a
goal as confidentiality. Each framework will be reviewed for non-captured properties
that will be appended to extend and create a final mapping of the four framework-
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s to a single set of security properties for A2E2. References for the contents and
background of each framework were discussed in Chapter 2, thus only the minimal
security requirements for each framework shall be considered for evaluation, and the
analysis will start from the most general to most specific frameworks.
Selection and Incorporation of CIA Triad Properties
Generic security properties and themes are presented with the CIA Triad even
with the extra features of authenticity and non-repudiation. On closer inspection the
most enabling technology for CIA capabilities is cryptography, and it allows for the
themes of Confidentiality and Integrity to be implemented. Nearly all security features
could have a form of General Cryptography, thus it is the first security property to
be considered for A2E2. No explicit details within CIA detail this general need for
base mathematical capabilities, but it becomes apparent the impact cryptography
has when looking at the technologies of one-way hash generation, one-time-pads, and
cryptographic keys (both asymmetric and symmetric) and their use with ciphers.
As such, core functions of cryptography enable larger security applications to be
generated (e.g., key generation, encryption, decryption), and general cryptography
stands as the base for many security functions and technologies.
Given the baseline of cryptography, the next focus in CIA examination looks to
more specifics of the confidentiality of system data. It was observed that two main
mechanisms that allow confidentiality to be achieved are data protection and access
control. Very few security specification or designs could be proposed if they did not
include mechanisms for data protection Elements and activities relating to protecting
data are considered to be those that cannot be subverted or understood when the
data is accessed (e.g., encryption protects data with mathematical operations that
greatly increase the complexity and computation needed to interpret the protected
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data). Yet, encryption can also be thought of as a form of access control, since
the only means of accessing encrypted information is with secret knowledge (e.g.,
a key) from a knowledgeable party (i.e., a person is granted permission and access
to encrypted data only by being informed of the protected secret/means). Other,
non-encryption, based mechanism exist for both data protection and access controls.
Use of “whitelisted” security mechanisms provide authorized agents, or users, that
are allowed access to non-encrypted data once validated. User namespaces and file
system partitioning enable authorization of data access as other examples of access
controls. Protection of data can be considered as a subset to access control properties,
but both are considered as individual A2E2 security properties given the wide range
of capabilities, methods, and protection mechanisms that exist for each category.
Integrity was the third property examined for security property identification for
this research. Data integrity usually means that a specific set of data can be validated
against a previous context (e.g., a one-way hash provides a fingerprint of sorts), and
integrity implies that a given set of data is not changed while in rest or when trans-
mitted. Like data protection the techniques of data integrity usually are implemented
with general or base cryptographic methods. Yet, unlike data protection and access
controls there are not guarantees regarding the privacy or access of other parties to
the contents (i.e., integrity shows that data is not manipulated, and does not ensure
access or protection mechanisms are circumvented).
The final included property for A2E2 inclusion was non-repudiated accounting.
Specific capabilities of interest are for system logging and tracing capabilities (e.g.,
system logs). In modern computing it is critical to maintain and keep records of activ-
ities that occur on computing systems. More importantly is the ability to validate and
ensure that records cannot be modified or falsified after occurring. Interesting devel-
opments in cryptocurrencies and block-chains show that such a ledger and journaling
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system can be applied in a wide range of applications, and as such their applicability
to security are being explored to this day. An extension of such non-repudiation tech-
nologies could be a record and journaling of system resources and data as to support
access control, data protection, and even data integrity applications.
There were two categories of the triad model that were not included for consid-
eration of A2E2 security properties. The two properties that were not included were
availability and authenticity. Availability was excluded for security properties, be-
cause the topic deals with the access to data and if at a given time such data can
be accessed or not. There are no new security related concerns, since activities could
be controlled or managed with access control mechanisms. It should be noted that
if new security features are enabled with availability, then future iterations of A2E2
should re-evaluate its inclusion.
The second, non-included category of authenticity appears to largely focus on
verification when used in higher level protocols or security applications. It is be-
ing argued that measures of authenticity are a mix between General Cryptography
and Data Integrity implementations. For instance the act of authentication is some
combination of validating a secret piece of information (e.g., a password that is then
hashed) or ensuring that a set of data meets an original parameter (e.g., a signed
message can be authenticated as a set of data that was configured or created with
a mix of data integrity and data protection means). It is likely that a security im-
plementation achieves authenticity goals via security properties previously discussed
(i.e., access control, data protection, or data integrity), thus the explicit property of
authentication is not used for A2E2.
At this point the initial A2E2 security properties from the CIA Triad categories
can be seen in Table 11.
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Table 11. The Initial Set of A2E2 Security Properties
CIA Triad-based Security Properties
General Cryptography
Access Control
Data Protection through Cryptographic Means
Data Integrity through Cryptographic Means
Non-repudiated Accounting
Selection and Incorporation of O-ISM3 Security Properties
O-ISM3 has core and recommended security processes that are collected in Table 5,
but not all of these processes are realizable to be implemented in software. Effectively,
8 of the 16 essential processes can be removed since they are activities of organizational
operations as opposed to implementable software capabilities (i.e., the operational
processes that deal with the management of business activities cannot not be realized
in a coded implementation). With the absence of administrative type-controls, the
nine applicable set of security processes are available in Table 12.
Table 12. The Nine Essential O-ISM3 Processes
Process Type Process Subcategory Process Name
Generic ISM Design and Evolution
Tactical Define Security Targets & Security Objectives
Tactical Service Level Management
Operational Life Cycle Control IT Managed Domain Patching
Operational Life Cycle Control Segmentation and Filtering Management
Operational Life Cycle Control Malware Protection Management
Operational Access and Environmental Control Access Control
Operational Availability Control Backup Management
Operational Testing and Auditing Information Quality and Compliance Assessment
The O-ISM3 provides no specific consensus of what is or isn’t a secure system de-
sign, since the document mainly deals with the general ideas, concepts, and execution
of security management. The model itself states there is “No One Solution Fits All”
and every organization has a unique context and constraints. This implies that the
O-ISM3 is used mainly for decision-making processes relating to security postures.
Yet, this model prevails over the CIA Triad since it provides concrete security-related
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topics, and the O-ISM3 provides examples that have an emphasis on measurability
of success via metrics. A set of themes of security features for the O-ISM3 was ob-
served: access control and journaling of a system can be used to ensure the integrity
of a specified design.
The first stage in identifying new security features focused on removal of duplica-
tion of topics. For instance the topic of access control was previously discussed with
the CIA Triad.
Upon closer examination the processes of Segmentation and Filtering Management
can be considered to as a topic of data integrity, since the description of the process
details similar goals that are achieved in the property of data integrity. The four
processes of (1) Define Security Targets & Security Objectives, (2) ISM Design and
Evolution, (3) Service Level Management, and (4) Backup Management were also
determined to fit within the existing A2E2 security properties. Specifically, the four
process are looking at data integrity, since they are trying to ensure that a given choice
of a process implementation meets an original target or design for a system/company.
The removal of the overlapping process provides three remaining processes: (1)
IT Managed Domain Patching, (2) Malware Protection Management, and (3) Infor-
mation Quality and Compliance Assessment. These bring a slight paradigm shift to
the properties for A2E2, since these three processes attempt to accurately record and
track known states with varying levels of information. The examination of each of
these processes brings a slight modification of non-repudiated accounting is proposed:
an addition of journaling. The terminology of accounting and journaling are very sim-
ilar, but one main difference can be interpreted as active versus passive activities. In
the case of journaling it should be considered as a passive, or background activity
(e.g., logging), since it could be greatly desirable to have information of previous
states or conditions to be recorded. However, the active components of accounting
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are the checks or analysis that would occur whether initiated automatically or man-
ually. Therefore, the three processes show that there could be the case of passive
tracking for a security system that may switch to an active accounting, but in both
cases it is critical to ensure that both versions of record keeping ensure the property
of non-repudiation. This analysis of the O-ISM3 now provides A2E2 Table 13 with
the new set of proposed security.
Table 13. The O-ISM3 Amended Set of A2E2 Security Properties
CIA Triad-based Security Properties
General Cryptography
Access Control
Data Protection through Cryptographic Means
Data Integrity through Cryptographic Means
Non-repudiated Accounting & Journaling
Selection and Incorporation of DoD-based Properties
Not all of the minimum DoD-based controls are applicable to A2E2 security prop-
erties in a similar manner seen in the analysis of O-ISM3 processes. However, given
the extensive and detailed list of controls in Table 9 an essay type analysis, as was
completed with the O-ISM3, was not be accomplished. In place of an essay-style
analysis the final set of the controls applicable to A2E2, with non-implementable
controls removed from consideration, were generated by mapping the DFARS con-
trols to an A2E2 security property. All mapped properties, mapped to A2E2 or
non-implementable properties, can be seen Tables 14 and 15. The remaining, non-
mapped controls are discussed for their merits of potential inclusion into A2E2’s
security properties in the following sections.
Four controls were found not to fit any of the existing categories based on the
analysis of the CIA Triad and the O-ISM3.
The controls can be seen in Table 14 and are: (1) Information Flow Enforcement,
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Table 14. Mapping DFARS Controls to Current A2E2 Properties
Control Assigned Property
Account Management Access Control
Access Enforcement Access Control
Information Flow Enforcement NONE
Least Privilege Access Control
Unsuccessful Logon Attempts Accounting & Journaling
Session Lock Access Control
Remote Access Access Control
Wireless Access Access Control
Access Control for Mobile Devices Access Control
Use of External Information Systems - AC-20(1) NONE
Use of External Information Systems - AC-20(2) NONE
Publicly Accessible Content NONE
Security Awareness Training Non-implementable
Audit Events Accounting & Journaling
Content of Audit Records Non-implementable
Audit Review, Analysis and Reporting Non-implementable
Audit Reduction and Report Generation Non-implementable
Timestamps Accounting & Journaling
Protection of Audit Information Data Integrity
Baseline Configuration Accounting & Journaling
Configuration Settings Accounting & Journaling
Least Functionality Access Control
Information System Component Inventory Non-implementable
Information System Backup Data Integrity
Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) Access Control
Identifier Management Access Control
(2) Use of External Information Systems - AC-20(1), (3) Use of External Informa-
tion Systems - AC-20(2), and (4) Publicly Accessible Content. These controls can
be divided up into two new A2E2 security properties, and the analysis is currently
presented.
The first DFARS-based control of Information Flow Enforcement brings awareness
of the ideas of data and execution flows at a program and system level, since there
could be concerns with how data is being moved and how a process is executing
within a system. For instance a Trojan obfuscates its malicious operations as benign
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Table 15. Mapping DFARS Controls to Current A2E2 Properties (cont.)
Control Assigned Property
Authenticator Management Access Control
Incident Response Training Non-implementable
Incident Handling Non-implementable
Incident Monitoring Accounting & Journaling
Incident Reporting Non-implementable
Non-local Maintenance Non-implementable
Maintenance Personnel Non-implementable
Timely Maintenance Media Protection Non-implementable
Media Storage Non-implementable
Media Sanitization & Maintenance Data Protection
Physical Access Authorizations Access Control
Physical Access Control Access Control
Access Control for Output Devices Access Control
Security Authorization Process Access Control
Vulnerability Scanning Accounting & Journaling
Application Partitioning Access Control
Information in Shared Resources Access Control
Boundary Protection Access Control
Transmission Confidentiality General Cryptography
Cryptographic Protection General Cryptography
Collaborative Computing Devices Non-implementable
Protection of Information at Rest Data Protection
Flaw Remediation Data Integrity
Malicious Code Protection Access Control
Information System Monitoring Accounting & Journaling
activities, but an execution flow control could possible prohibit or prevent such actions
to occur. Additionally, if data is being moved, located, or even being transmitted in a
certain fashion this could lead to data leakage or spillage that would not normally be
covered by access controls. Therefore a new security property of Data and Execution
Flows is proposed as to help mitigate malicious activities and enforce a means of
controlling and enforcing both activities.
The next security property being proposed deals with the conditions of external
versus internal security conditions. Effectively, the controls of Use of External In-
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formation Systems and Publicly Accessible Content showcase a special case of access
controls that deal with issues external to a system. In essence, a security concern may
stem from interactions external to the designed system and such input and output
would need to be developed and designed in a different manner than fully realizable,
and internal, solutions. An example external communications could that of Appli-
cation Programming Interfaces, networking protocols and communications, and even
concurrent or shared memory for a design. In these cases special care may need to be
given that extend beyond capabilities of data protection, data integrity, or access con-
trols (e.g., a web server or web service is usually designed to be open and accessible,
which seems the opposite of security). Likely the use of current A2E2 properties are
leveraged to implement and build up to a specific design, but given the complexity
and special nature of external impacts (i.e., effects that are out of control of a current
design) a new category is proposed.
The consolidated set of proposed A2E2 security properties are seen in Table 16.
Table 16. The DoD Amended Set of A2E2 Security Properties
DoD-based Security Properties
General Cryptography
Access Control
Data Protection through Cryptographic Means
Data Integrity through Cryptographic Means
Non-repudiated Accounting & Journaling
Data and Execution Flows
External Communications Security
Selection and Incorporation of Android Properties
The easiest selections of properties to evaluate for A2E2 are those that already ex-
ist in Android. To reiterate from Chapter 2, the Android Application Sandbox has the
following features: data management (internal, external, or content providers), per-
mission configuration for device assets (e.g., the camera), permissions for networking,
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input validation, cryptography, inter-process communication (network sockets, shared
files, intents, binders, or messenger), dynamically code loading, and Dalvik virtual
machine settings. However, at this point the security of the Android Sandbox does
not provide any new category of A2E2 security properties, because each of the securi-
ty features could map to at least one existing category. This does not imply that the
current list of A2E2 properties are fully encompassing or completed, but it perhaps
showcases how the analysis of several models can help identify core properties that
can be leveraged across multiple designs.
The Proposed Security Properties for A2E2
Given the research into security properties from the previous models and system,
and seeking the establishment of system design requirements, this research proposes
the following categories of security properties for system design: General Cryptogra-
phy, Access Control, Data Protection through Cryptographic Means, Data Integrity
through Cryptographic Means, Non-repudiated Accounting & Journaling, Data and
Execution Flows, and External Communications Security. These are in fact the final
properties as proposed in Table 16. As oft mentioned, this list does not preclude
the addition of new properties, so perhaps a most accurate description is this set of
security properties being the version of a continually updated and analyzed frame-
work. The intention for this design is to combine and consolidated like properties as
to enable full system security, since it should be noted that these properties could
be extended and be applied beyond the usage of assured application isolation. This
can be important when approaching a design problem from the perspective of a the
Formal Verification Cycle. Having examined several different approaches to secu-
rity properties and controls, this final and consolidated distillation forms the basis
for A2E2 security. Hopefully, this encourages and enable resource of proven security
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properties; such a practice could be thought of as Proof Designs Once, Implement
Everywhere (...which also needs assurance via proof).
Recommended Security Properties for an A2E2 Container
The final consideration for security property design and requirements is given to
the implementation of an A2E2 container with the newly defined security proper-
ties. At this time the properties are a recommended best practice, since no explicit
property was defined and formally verified (i.e., these properties would need explicit
implementations and verification to become a known and assured security method).
An issue discovered by this research is the “chicken and egg” type problem, since
the desired security properties must be defined and proven but at the outset of the
research no known tools or techniques were known to verify such security properties.
Assuming that the development of an A2E2 container were to be completed, then the
proposed security properties would also become validated and assured. As it stands
not all properties proposed for A2E2 are needed to implement a Android contain-
er, but the point is conceded that each property could be applicable to a container.
Thus, in terms of this research an A2E2 container is being sought that isolates the
partitioned file directory and execution of processes in a single environment, so to
help drive and define the research for the methods identification for theory and im-
plementation assurance. In this case the security properties of A2E2 that would likely
need implementation are: General Cryptography, Access Control, and Data Integrity.
Simply: the first generation container should be able to isolate its process execution
in a container, which is able to be saved in a state that is able to be paused, stopped,
or resumed. This first generation container is similar to Chroot, since applications
would run within their own space on an Android device, and any enhanced features
(e.g., communication control with Android and other containers, activity monitor-
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ing and logging, encrypted containers and asymmetric key infrastructures) is left for
future research.
IV.2 Specification Assurance Findings
This section describes an applied approach to formal validation of security proper-
ty when prototyped with a functional programming language. The goal of validation
was attempted with Haskabelle and Isabelle. This section highlights establish-
ing a validation environment, prototyping an example Haskell program, conversion
to Isar for Isabelle with the Haskabelle tool, and an execution of the proof
assistant to show the validity of the converted prototype.
Establishing a Validation Environment
Using the seL4 Development Environment with Docker
The first step in specification validation focused on the creation of a stable valida-
tion environment. The seL4 team published and made freely available a Docker-based
assurance and proving environment, which was discussed in Chapter 2. Instructions
provided on the team’s development blog were leveraged on a new installation of
Ubuntu 17.04. The directions were straight forward, and it was verified that the stat-
ed system requirements (e.g., RAM and storage space) were the minimum required
requirements that allow successful configuration and execution of the environment
(i.e., provided system resources under the recommended amount crashed when exe-
cuting Isabelle proofs). No further instructions or use of this environment was ana-
lyzed once the main seL4 Isabelle proofs successfully executed (i.e., the environment
is offered to re-validate or extend the work of seL4, but this line of research and
usage was not needed for A2E2). This provisioning effort was captured in a BASH
script called “cl4c” (or “CLACK”), which automates the blog instructions to setup
72
the Docker-based environment.
Having the environment installed, and the cl4c provisioning script available, it was
determined that this environment will be used for Haskell to Isabelle validation effort-
s. However, this development environment was deemed to be too over-featured (i.e.,
the environment includes all needed tools for seL4 development from source code),
and did not directly support deployment on Android. Specifically, the environment
lacks needed tools for Android implementations (e.g., Java or Bionic-C based imple-
mentations). Thus, a simpler means to provision and deploy an Isabelle environment
for A2E2) was identified.
Isabelle 2017 and Docker
It was decided to discover a solitary environment for Isabelle given the complex
system requirements and non-needed features in the seL4 environment. A proving and
validation environment featuring Isabelle within a Docker container was found. A
Dockerfile (i.e., a Docker provisioning and configuration script) was found on Docker
Hub, which is a freely hosted website with a collection of Docker scripts and containers
by Docker Inc. The Dockerfile runs on a computer with Docker installed, but it was
identified that this Dockerfile needs a pre-downloaded copy of the 2017 edition of
Isabelle. This copy of the tool is located on the main Isabelle website as a
single archive. Once the Dockerfile and the Isabelle archive are contained in the
same directory, then the Docker container can be built and automatically provisioned
with following command: ‘docker build .’.
After the Docker container is built the created images can be seen with the com-
mand: ‘docker images − a’. To establish a baseline and restorable image for the
container a tag can be used. This tag can be set when using the identification code
with the following command: ‘docker tag (ImageID) (Repository : Tag)’ (e.g.,
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‘docker tag 123412341234 Haskabelle2015 : initial’). With the Docker container
built and the tag established, which allows the environment to be restored to this
initial state, then container can be invoked in an interactive mode via the command:
‘docker run − it Haskabelle2015 : initial /bin/bash’.
This simplified Docker container exists and enables Isabelle use with having
the latest 2017 edition. This container holders the proving and validation tools similar
to the seL4 team environment, but this new container does not have any undesired or
unneeded files (e.g., the seL4 source files). This environment allows for validation of
Isar script files once the files are moved into the container. However, this variant of
an Isabelle environment does not achieve an easier method of converting Haskell into
proof script automatically, since it was discovered that Haskabelle is not included
in the 2017 edition.
Isabelle 2015 with Haskabelle and Docker
Haskabelle is a tool that automates the process of converting Haskell source
code to Isar proof script. This tool was seen as useful for A2E2 since it aims to
reduce the workload, time, and tools needed to generate proof script from a Haskell
prototype. Given the advantages of Haskabelle a final environment was sought to
provide the tool with Isabelle to provide a development and validation environ-
ment for A2E2.
Haskabelle does not have a sole website that acts as the central repository for
information or executable versions. Two resources found were on the main Isabelle
website and a GitHub.com mirror of the source code [82][83][84][84]. It was deter-
mined the main distribution method for Haskabelle was its inclusion into the main
Isabelle distribution/archive. However, the tool was not present in the 2017 edi-
tion, which as confirmed with the previous Docker container setup. This absence
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of Haskabelle is also true in the 2016 edition, and the last updated version that
includes Haskabelle is the 2015 edition of Isabelle.
Hence, a Dockerfile was extended from the Dockerfile for Isabelle 2017 to
instead install and provision the 2015 version. The Dockerfile for the Isabelle 2015
edition was ensured to have the proper dependencies and auto-downloads the needed
archives to automate the configuration and provisioning of a Docker image. This
new container installation includes both Isabelle and Haskabelle in a single
container. An additional feature was the creation of a work space, to store developed
and validation files for Isabelle, and this folder is located in the root directory
with the name Isabelle Workspace/. The final action for this environment was to
execute the Docker commands to set image tags, which were followed as detailed in
the previous section.
Applied Tools and Methods for Security Property Validation
Using Haskabelle with Isabelle
The final environment created allowed the use of both Isabelle or Haskabelle
and Isabelle is used. It should be noted that this environment is configured for
running command line-based invocations. If the graphical version of Isabelle is
required then it should be installed outside of the Docker container (e.g., another
Virtual Machine or directly on the Host Machine). When using the container, a
common issue arises with the import and export of development files can be a problem.
As a recommendation: an external Git repository works well to push and pull data
in or out of the container. Yet, another solution, with Docker, focuses on mounting
a portion of the host machine space into the container, but this method was not
leveraged in this research. Once the Haskell source has been moved into the container,
then Isabelle can the Haskabelle generated Isar files.
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At this time no specific security properties for A2E2 were modeled or implemented
as a Haskell prototype. However, a simple Haskell program was used to explore
and evaluate Haskabelle with the prototype of a Binary Tree via the Haskell
BTree module. A tutorial by Seipp was found and it shows a methodology of using
Haskabelle to generate the the Isar theory files. Additionally, the tutorial shows
how to place in the desired steps and constraints for proving the prototyped code into
the generated Isar source.
Specifically, the tutorial takes the actions of (1) creates a base Binary Tree in
Haskell (e.g., a BTree.hs source file), (2) leverages Haskabelle to generate the Isar
theory files (e.g., BTree.thy and the source file Prelude.thy for Haskell definitions in
Isabelle), (3) by-hand addition of lemmas into the generated Binary Tree the-
ory file (e.g., BTree.thy), and (4) Isabelle execution of the files to validate the
Haskell prototype in its Isar represented form. Completing these actions and exe-
cuting the resulting theory files with the command line version of Isabelle can
be non-intuitive for analysis. Another method used for evaluating the execution of
Isabelle is the visual inspection of the Isar files via the GUI version of the tool.
Figure 5 through Figure 12 show screenshots of the final versions of the tutorials code
with the respective output of line-by-line processing.
Figure 5. Added Lemma 1 Initialization in Isabelle
The output of Isabelle is not immediately apparent for the tool’s results. There
is no explicit pass or fail indication on screen when processing a theory file. There
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Figure 6. Added Lemma 1 Induction Strategy Applied in Isabelle
Figure 7. Added Lemma 1 Induction Strategy Finished in Isabelle
are certain means to identify successful execution for a given source file. Specifically,
the documentation for Isabelle states than if the output shows ?x =?x then the
tool is able to instantiate the provided lemmas arbitrarily which means the lemmas
are valid [85]. The final Isabelle output in Figure 8 and Figure 12 shows the
case that ?t =?t when applying a flatten inductive strategy to the Binary Tree. This
means the the tutorial Haskabelle output (e.g., BTree.thy) with the inserted proof
logic for the lemmas were successfully executed in Isabelle. This process could
be extended for other cases of prototyped Haskell code. This example shows a single
implementation, but it is conceivable that A2E2 security properties could be proven
Figure 8. Added Lemma 1 Work Finished in Isabelle
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Figure 9. Added Lemma 2 Initialization in Isabelle
Figure 10. Added Lemma 2 Induction Strategy Applied in Isabelle
or disproven when following this outlined validation methodology.
Current Issues in Leveraging Haskabelle for Automated Theorem
Proving
The tutorial provided a process to validate Haskell prototypes with the steps of:
(1) generating a prototyped feature in Haskell, (2) converting the code to Isar with
Haskabelle, (3) adding the appropriate logic and theory lemmas into the Isar,
and (4) leveraging Isabelle for validation of the source code. These methodology
proves and validates a Haskell prototype can be accurately modeled in a functional
programming language. The process of leveraging Haskabelle will generate an
Isar representation. Yet, this method is only a partial automation, since it cannot
Figure 11. Added Lemma 2 Induction Strategy Finished in Isabelle
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Figure 12. Added Lemma 2 Work Finished in Isabelle
generate the semantics needed for automated theorem and lemma implementation,
which was seen with a non-trivial process of adding the appropriate logic for ensuring
a correct design. The tool stops short of fully automating a solution, since it has no
means of including or generating the needed Isar proof logic.
IV.3 Implementation Verification Findings
A Model System and Approach: Docker
Once the first two stages of the Formal Verification Life Cycle are completed (i.e.,
security properties are identified and each are validated) then a specification can be
developed and implemented in a programming language. The research assumed a
specification for a container was valid, because it allowed the discovery and iden-
tification of formal methods for implementation verification. Hence, this research
looked at imperative programming languages, implementation verification tools, and
operating systems that would support Android container development.
Similar capabilities exist within Linux android operating systems, since these sys-
tems are based off of the Linux kernel. It was determined that containerization on one
OS would be equivalent to the other for a real world implementation. The Docker tool
was modeled to support the realization a Android-based containment implementation,
since Docker executes on Linux kernel as a container environment/tool. Docker has
used the Go programming language to implement container mechanics (i.e., Docker
was programmed in Golang and leverages Linux kernel features and function calls to
achieve namespace-based isolation), and the programming language has applicable
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Android application tool-chains for development. Therefore this research sought a
method of containment with Golang, since an implementation could be theoretically
ported to Android.
Determination of Tools and Approaches for an A2E2 Container Imple-
mentation
It was assumed for this research if a Linux software container could be constructed,
then a conversion of the container to an Android version of the container is possible.
Software development tools exist for both Linux android, so the only undetermined
tool(s) relate to formal methods supporting implementation verification. The driving
factor for formal method selection is based upon the implementation programming
language, which was determined with the modeling of Docker. Techniques and tools
were reviewed to determine which of the three main approaches of formal methods
could be applied to Go-based code. The selected the formal method technique to be
leveraged was abstract interpretation, and it was determined that symbolic execution
offers a new verification method for Go. The following sections discuss the selected
methods and tools needed to generate and verify a Golang-based software container.
A Go Implementation of a Linux Container
As discussed in Chapter 2 there are multiple examples of Go containers online.
It was determined that Rice’s container implementation was going to be used in this
research after reviewing several different implementations of Go-based containers.
The code offered a simple container that was under one hundred lines of Go code, and
there are several sources documenting its implementation and development. Rice’s
code was tested and confirmed to execute on Ubuntu Linux 16.04 based on the GitHub
hosted source file. This Linux container built in Go was not validated to be an A2E2
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specification, but the container shows how an implementation could be created and
subsequently verified. Given the simplicity of the design it was determined that
security property validation could be extended or reuse Rice’s implementation in
capturing a valid A2E2 specification.
Verifying Program Correctness with Symbolic Execution
In order to assure an implementation, via verification, abstract interpretation
of Go executables was researched. There are various formal methods that satisfy
abstract interpretation, but it was decided to leverage symbolic execution for a Go
implementation. As discussed in Chapter 2 there are many benefits to leveraging
symbolic execution, but the driving factor for this decision was the discovered tool
KLEE.
KLEE presented a challenging approach, since it does not have a presence with
native, C-based, Android applications nor does it have an implementation for Go-
based code. However, a recent tool, gollvm, had been introduced into the Go
development pantheon, and it is based on the LLVM compiler infrastructure that
KLEE uses. It was decided to that a Go implementation could be verified by using
KLEE’s symbolic execution if it were able to process the outputs provided by gollvm.
Findings in Applied Implementation Verification Methods
KLEE Analysis and Evaluation
The final effort for the research focused on developing the techniques needed to
leverage KLEE with the Go container implementation. This attempt is the known
attempt of creating a Go abstract interpreters with a symbolic execution tool/frame-
work. The selection of KLEE was motivated by the tool’s use with C/C++ source
code, since the source code and libraries are can be invoked by Go program. Another
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motivating factor is leveraging KLEE was based on the large amount of documentation
and tutorials for using the tool.
Before analysis and use of the tool started a final action of selecting and building
a development environment was completed. The KLEE can be built from the source
code for a respective environment (e.g., bare metal host machine, development envi-
ronment virtual machine, etc.), or the tool can be leveraged with a provided Docker
environment. The Docker development environment was selected, since issues relat-
ing to non-resolved dependencies were discovered when building the tool from source
code. Specifically, the source code building failed due to a dependency upon the
LLVM project’s code base (that is considerably large), and the specific issue causing
compilation errors was not discovered. Hence, the work and source code were simply
executed within the KLEE-provided Docker container, and the development files were
moved into the container for analysis.
The main method to ensuring the proper setup for the KLEE environment was
accomplished by following the tutorials provided on the main klee.github.io web-
site. The base example, or the “Hello World” for KLEE, is programmed in C/C++
and was executed to validate proper setup and configuration of Docker develop-
ment environment. This example leverages the primary KLEE function call (i.e.,
klee make symbolic()) in a simple program comprised of a series of if-else statements,
which test an integer to be positive, negative, or zero. Several resulting analysis and
runtime files were created with the source code when it is compiled and executed.
Most importantly there are methods to generate the LLVM Intermediate Represen-
tation of the source code via the LLVM Clang compiler. The LLVM-IR can be
generated from the source code when it is compiled with Clang. The compilation
options of “-I” flag and the setting of “-emit-llvm” result in the generation of bitcode
as a “.bc” file. The bitcode file was directly executed by KLEE, and the output of the
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tool is seen in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Example KLEE Execution of LLVM-IR bitcode
The symbolic execution of the source code is automatically generated, and the
used test cases and outputs were evaluated. Figure 14 shows the simple test cases
and the results from KLEE (i.e, the results of the test for positive, zero, or a negative
number).
Figure 14. Example Evaluation of KLEE Execution Output
At this point it was determined that KLEE was able to be leveraged as an abstract
Interpreter with the used of symbolic execution.
Attempted Integration of KLEE via gollvm
The remaining task in applying KLEE to the Go-based container was two folded:
(1) discover a means of generating Go-based LLVM-IR, and (2) integrate the KLEE
tests into the base Go code. In the attempt to generate LLVM-IR, two discovered
Go/LLVM tools were found. The tools llgo and gollvm were evaluated. The llgo
tool was one of the first attempts seeking to integrate LLVM and Go, since it sought
to generate Go executables with the LLVM framework. The tool and its sources are
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available on both GitHub.com and are included in the main LLVM project. However,
the tool did not successfully compile or run per the provided instructions during this
research.
The gollvm tool was found under active development, and is integrated into the
official Go language experimental source file repository. This tool was successfully
used alongside the full LLVM framework, and compiled an example Go program’s
source code to the LLVM-IR bitcode. However, a difficulty identified in this approach
and tool was the fact that there is no easily development environment provisioning
script. There were many issues building the tool from source with respect to the
LLVM source. However, two stable git commits were discovered for both LLVM and
gollvm that created a stable gollvm development environment. A set of a BASH
provisioning and installation scripts were generated to replicate this development
environment, and the scripts can be found in in Appendix C.1 and C.2.
At this point LLVM and gollvm were executed, but only in a manner that is
currently independent of KLEE. It was successfully determined that the gollvm tool
provides a sub-tool called llvm-goparse. This new tool was leveraged to generate
the LLVM-IR with the same Clang command line flag of −dump− ir. An example
program, provided by the gollvm team, was used and its use with KLEE can be found
in Appendix C.3 through Appendix C.5.
The complete integration of KLEE’s C/C++ based calls for gollvm compilable
Go code was not completed. Thus, the use of KLEE to verify a Go-based container is
unknown to being a possible formal method or not. Also, considerable effort remains
to a single, joint KLEE and gollvm development environment. One finding for these
tools was the fact that gollvm is experimental in nature, and its code-base seems to
be unstable with the main LLVM framework. Additionally, The efforts attempting
integrate gollvm into the KLEE-provided Docker image failed,
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter summarizes the state of A2E2 research and presents both lessons
learned and recommended future work. A list of security properties relevant to A2E2
was generated (Chapters 3 and 4), and these properties can be used to direct future
efforts with the Formal Verification Cycle. It remains to assure the security properties
and to complete the validation and verification of a specification and implementation
of an A2E2 container.
V.1 Three Stage Approach Overview and Research Contributions
This thesis focuses on a three stage approach to formal assurance on Android.
The first stage identifies and defines security properties, the second identifies and
applies tools for property validation in a specification, and the final evaluates new
implementation verification methods for a Go language-based container. Each of the
stages provided new insights for A2E2 formal assurance, and this section reviews the
general findings for each.
Security Properties for Assured Android Container Specifications
There is not a de facto standard set of security properties for use in a formally
verified specification. The consolidation of security properties led to the discovery of a
“the chicken or the egg” problem: the final properties proposed need to be validated
with a formal tools and methods (e.g., proof assistants, model checkers, abstract
interpreters), but a final set of tools and methods could not be executed without
verifying applicable tools (i.e., feedback from the second and third stages of research
identified some tools and methods and how to apply them to validating and verifying
a specification). Additionally, it was determined the complexity for full validation of
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each property was too extensive to be fully realized in this research. The security
properties should be viewed as best practices, since they have yet to be validated with
formal assurance methods. Once a final tool and approach are selected, the proposed
properties can be validated for an Android specification. When the properties are
assured then the result would be an a la carte menu for core security properties and
features selection.
Lessons Learned with Former Specification Validation Approaches and
Tools
The approaches examined in the first stage of the research illustrate methods
that can be used for reasoning with respect to validation of a theoretical design
of a specification. That being said, there were multiple lessons learned with the
researched methods used by the seL4 to changes over the past eight years. A large
impact to functional prototyping with Haskell has affected the Haskabelle tool
and presumably seL4. The Haskell language, in 2014, had a fundamental change for
their monad implementations as discussed in Chapter 2. Given the extensive use of
monads by the Haskabelle tool it is no longer compatible with modern Isabelle
versions, and until the underlying code and functionality of the tool are updated to
the new monad standard, only the old versions will work. This does not necessarily
prevent assured development, but it brings into question whether these tools can be
used for sustainable or future solutions.
Two main discoveries were with the applied sections of this research. The first
discovery was the identification that Haskabelle was considered deprecated in 2015
by the Isabelle team. The second discovery was that the former methods of the
seL4 team would not be able to be reused for this research (i.e., the tools were not
discovered for Haskell to Isar conversion and are presumed to be too specific for seL4
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for general assurance work). As such, a Docker environment was created to support
older versions of Isabelle and Haskabelle illustrating that former methods are
still useful in specification assurance. This environment was validated with a Haskell
prototype that was processed and verified by Haskabelle and Isabelle. The set
of provisioning scripts used to setup and configure the Docker environment can be
found included in Appendix C.1 and C.2.
Formally Assured Go Language Applications
The final stage of research focused on the identification of new methods of im-
plementation verification for Go language applications. This approach was patterned
on Docker’s implementation, since it provides containment method the Linux kernel.
Applications created with the Go language may offer a new approach for source code
implementation that is portable to Android (e.g., the two main approaches for An-
droid are with Java-based or native code-based programming). It is unclear whether
the Go language container can be directly executed on Android (in particular, issues
remain with OS permissions and Android tool-chain compatibility with the Gomobile
suite). Cross-compiling the Go source code to Android was beyond the scope of this
effort.
Advances in the gollvm tool enable the building of Go code within the LLVM
compiler infrastructure. A compatible gollvm and LLVM versions, was found, and
Docker was used to create a stable development environment. This process allowed
a repeatable and stable build process. The Docker container allows for example Go-
based Linux container to be built with LLVM into the LLVM-IR, which was needed
as input for KLEE’s symbolic engine.
KLEE is based upon the C language, and there are no Go language bindings
for KLEE. A focus of the third stage was attempting the integration of Go with C
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functions and libraries. Ideally the integration would allow Go-based implementations
to invoke KLEE’s C/C++ functionality. It remains to create Go bindings for KLEE.
The Go container was built to LLVM-IR, and the KLEE examples in C/C++ were
successfully executed.
An Initial A2E2 Framework
Each of the three stages of research made progress. These findings provide a formal
framework for the selection of formal assurance properties, which are validated and
verified with theorem proving and by means of symbolic execution. Future work
needs to be assured, and the reusable Haskabelle/Isabelle environment can
be leveraged in future work. Additionally, this research has shown a potential path
forward in the Go programming language if symbolic execution was applied to show
implementation verification. This initial framework shows applied tools and formal
methods used in formal assurance (i.e., validation and verification) of A2E2. Other
tools may exist that are easier to use or more stable and that can sustain ongoing
assured development.
V.2 Other Findings
In this section, the topics of tool reusage, cautions on immature programming
languages, identification of issues with past approaches, and cursory research into
new and upcoming formal method techniques are presented.
Benefits of Formal Method Tool Reusage
There are benefits to using legacy tools even if they are deprecated or abandoned.
Older versions of tools sometimes still work, and some methods presented by past
research are still applicable to modern assurance attempts. Specifically, in appro-
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priate circumstances, legacy tools in container-based development environments are
preferable to tool versions that support host machine-based installations.
However, for a production environment up-to-date tools should be used. In par-
ticular, when leveraging Haskell tools such as Haskabelle are deprecated and not
recommended. The development of new tools can be quite intensive in total man-
hours, but such should be considered, especially for collaborative efforts. Further-
more, tradeoffs exist between formal method tools, so another consideration should
be in matching new efforts to existing work a respective field of study. For exam-
ples, some organizations could focus on model checking for assurance, as opposed to
theorem proving, so new work may be able those efforts instead.
Difficulties in Formal Verification of Immature Language
The Go language was released in 2009 and has gained popularity since the release,
but as of this writing it is an immature language. Many existing and established
languages have many tools that have accumulated since 1976 to support formal as-
surance. Yet, the Go language was created recently, so it has not had the benefit of
formal assurance tools. As of this writing there is no evidence of major efforts toward
formal verification for Go. New tools must be implemented for Go such as a Haskell
to Go tool for prototyping, and completed Go bindings for KLEE. Additionally, no
formally verified Go compiler is currently available. Hence, additional tools are need-
ed to interpret and verify Go compiled binaries, and an effort to build a formally
verified Go compiler must be completed.
New Developments of Formal Method Approaches
Non-supported, deprecated, or abandonware is not uncommon with many open
source and academic research tools. Knowing the current state of Haskabelle,
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stemming from the changes in Haskell, there might be motivation reevaluate tools
choice for formal assurance. The current method of leveraging the Formal Verification
Cycle could be kept as a model, and it could be leveraged and executed with new
tools. A first order examination of current research shows a new formal proof assistant
Coq is being leveraged in the formal methods community. Coq could be a direct
replacement for Isabelle with respect to this research, and the shown method of
Haskell prototyping appears to be achievable is a similar manner with this new tool.
The specifics and methodologies of this tool is not explored, but it is recommended for
evaluation given its current popular and community acceptance. Using the “current
popular tool” may allow for the most up-to-date implementation as to avoid issues
that occurred with Haskabelle.
V.3 Path Forward and Recommended Actions
The last portion of the thesis looks at and proposed new paths forward based on
the research herein. It is assumed that the A2E2 properties are acceptable and use
of the Formal Verification Cycle is followed (i.e., assurance of a specification, which
is followed by verification of an implementation). Assuming these two conditions,
there are multiple issues that were unaddressed or identified at the conclusion of this
research. This set of future work is not all-inclusive, but it aims to provide insights
for any researcher following on this effort.
Security Property Theory Validation
As previously discussed, the security properties presented in Chapter 4 are cur-
rently considered as a “best practice” approach. This research was unable to exercise
the proposed method of design theory assurance to individual cases of the security
properties. However, once a set of tools are decided for design theory assurance,
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then the implementation and verification of the properties can commence. It is rec-
ommended to start with a single property to verify (e.g., Access Control). Upon the
successful validation of the first property, then the remainder of the properties (or the
subset of properties for a specification) could be verified by replicating the assurance
process. This assurance of the security properties validates and proves the theory for
the Formal Verification Life Cycle, and each successfully completion of a property al-
lows subsequent specifications and designs to reuse the assured work. This validation
could allow implicit trust when leveraging A2E2 properties, and potentially allow a
focus on implementation efforts (as opposed to theory and property validation) in the
future.
Determining Methods of Automated Assurance
Another observation has been a trend toward the use and implementation of au-
tomated formal verification. Solutions exist for “by hand” assurance techniques, but
commonly these approaches are extremely rigorous and tedious. These approaches
can take a considerable amount of time to construct and verify. A more preferred way
is for an automation of the assurance methods for chosen security properties. Ideally,
these automated tools allow a security property to be chosen or implemented into a
specification with minimal effort after the first successfully use (i.e., there may need
to be an investment into the first case of assurance by validation, but future work
would reuse past assured property in other specifications).
An example of a tool, striving for such automation, is MIT Programming Lan-
guages & Verification Group’s “Fiat” tool. The tool is stated to allow a declarative
specification to generate a correct-by-construction program while providing a formal
proof trail certifying that the program meets the original specification [86]. This tool
could be thought analogously to the process of what Haskabelle does for Haskell
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and Isabelle, but Fiat leverages the functional programming language of OCaml
and Coq [86]. Fiat’s build process could shorten the time it would take to construct an
implementable program, since the tool appears to automate the whole construction
and process idealized in the Formal Verification Cycle. The tool was only identified
recently, thus more analysis and verification of the tool and its capabilities are needed.
Native Code vs. Java-based Code Market Share Analysis
It is considered that Go language built code is equivalent, or at least in the same
category of software, as native code for Android. This acknowledgment is significant,
since Android typically divides it software into two categories of native code (e.g., C-
based code with the Bionic library) Java-based code. There are issues of using native
code applications since they execute in a different fashion than Java-based applica-
tions. For instance the example A2E2 Go container was a native code application,
and its containment would be for other native code applications (e.g., no Java run-
time environment is native to the Linux Kernel or as ELF executables, thus the only
supported programs would be for native code programs). Additionally, the majority
of Android programs are presumed to not be native code, so the current container
would also not be able to run this majority of applications. This may stem from
facts like Google’s documentation recommends to not build native code applications
citing potential security concerns [56]. Therefore, to ensure the greatest application
coverage, with respect to A2E2 projects, then it should be determined what percent
of applications are either native code or Java based. This information could be gained
by a market share analysis of Google Play Android applications. Once this market
share of applications is determined, then a final decision should be made to determine
which style of Android A2E2 projects implement.
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General Applicability of A2E2
An interesting side effect in the research and identification of A2E2 security prop-
erties was no Android-specific properties were defined. The identified security prop-
erties were abstracted in a manner such that they are not tied to a specific platform
or operating system. Additionally, the implementation attempted in the research was
based on Go and not any Android specifics. The tested materials and procedures
were completed on personal computers, so even though the intended target was An-
droid, the fact remains the development occurred mostly on Linux. This leaves open
research directions of assured specifications and designs for general computing and
on desktop operating systems.
Work Relating to Model Checking and the Formal Verification Cycle
One topic that was not explored during this research is the application of model
checking for either stage of specification validation or implementation verification. It
is not known what types of tools or capabilities are available for model checking, but
this type of system abstraction is another popular approach in the formal methods
community. It may be the case that an equivalent, or easier, approaches exist to
validate A2E2 designs. Models for containment on Android may exist to support
A2E2, but no research was executed thus no recommended methods or tools can
be provided. This discussion seeks to present the topic and make readers aware of
another avenue in assurance.
Determining Android Specific Implementation Concerns
The main effort of this research was accomplished on Linux desktop computers.
Specifically, the Go compiler was leveraged to test out the mock container program,
and the gomobile tool chain verified the ability to generate Android applications.
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However, the mock container implementation was never ported to Android, and any
specific implementation constraints and limitations for Android were never identified.
An example case would be with respect to the Bionic C library. This library does
not permit all native Linux API and function calls to be leveraged or executed on
Android, and many of these restrictions are due to Android’s security and permission
model (e.g., if a phone is not rooted with full permissions and access, then typical
privileged API calls would be denied). It is extremely likely that the issues seen in
C and native code implementations will exist with Go-based solutions. Apiece of
evidence that can support these concerns is the fact that the Go container executable
must be run as root, or with sudo-based permissions, to properly execute on Linux.
This is only one example, but such concerns should be considered and subsequently
identified for Android execution for containment. If such restrictions were found, then
it may be the case that the ability to control and implement a Go based container is
impossible due to Android’s current model
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Appendix A. Chapter 1 Related Documents
The following appendix contains source code and scripts leveraged in the work
present in Chapter 1.
A.1 CVE Analysis - Acquire Archives Script
1 #!/ bin / bash
2
3 webSite=” https : // s t a t i c . nvd . n i s t . gov/ f e e d s / j son / cve /1 .0/ ”
4 ZipFolder=”Raw Zips”
5
6 Zips=(
7 #nvdcve−1.0−modi f ied . j son . z i p
8 #nvdcve−1.0− recen t . j son . z i p
9 nvdcve−1.0−2017. j son . z ip
10 nvdcve−1.0−2016. j son . z ip
11 nvdcve−1.0−2015. j son . z ip
12 nvdcve−1.0−2014. j son . z ip
13 nvdcve−1.0−2013. j son . z ip
14 nvdcve−1.0−2012. j son . z ip
15 nvdcve−1.0−2011. j son . z ip
16 nvdcve−1.0−2010. j son . z ip
17 nvdcve−1.0−2009. j son . z ip
18 #nvdcve −1.0−2008. j son . z i p
19 #nvdcve −1.0−2007. j son . z i p
20 #nvdcve −1.0−2006. j son . z i p
21 #nvdcve −1.0−2005. j son . z i p
22 #nvdcve −1.0−2004. j son . z i p
23 #nvdcve −1.0−2003. j son . z i p
24 #nvdcve −1.0−2002. j son . z i p
25 )
26
27 i f [ [ ! −d ” $ZipFolder ” ] ] ; then
28 mkdir −p $ZipFolder
29 i f [ [ ”$?” == ”0” ] ] ; then
30 echo ” [NOTE] Created new arch ive f o l d e r : $ZipFolder ”
31 else
32 echo ” [ERROR] Couldn ’ t c r e a t e the a r ch ive f o l d e r ! ”
33 exit 1
34 f i
35 f i
36
37 pushd $ZipFolder
38 for z ip in ${Zips [ ∗ ] } ; do
39 i f [ [ ! −f ” $z ip ” ] ] ; then
40 echo ” [NOTE] Downloading : $z ip ”
41 wget $webSite$z ip
42 else
43 echo ” [NOTE] Skipping f i l e ( $z ip ) . I t e x i s t s ! ”
44 f i
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45 done
46 popd
A.2 CVE Analysis - Analysis Script
1 #!/ bin / bash
2 ZipFolder=”Raw Zips”
3 ExtractFolder=” Extracted Z ips ”
4 Ana lys i sFo lder=” Ana lys i s ”
5 runDate=‘ date +”%Y−%m−%dT%H−%M” ‘
6 echo ” [DEBUGGING] Run date : $runDate”
7
8 #bjson==BROKEN JSON
9 Globa lVulnsFi l e=$runDate” Globa lL i s t Vu lns . b json ”
10 echo ” [DEBUGGING] Global save f i l e : $Globa lVulnsFi l e ”
11
12 s ea r c hS t r i n g =’”product name” : ” android ” ’
13
14 z i p s =( ‘ l s $ZipFolder | grep zip ‘ )
15
16 i f [ [ ! −d ” $ZipFolder ” ] ] ; then
17 echo ” [ERROR] Zip f o l d e r DOES NOT EXIST ! ( $ZipFolder ) ”
18 exit
19 f i
20
21 i f [ [ ! −d ” $ExtractFolder ” ] ] ; then
22 mkdir −p $ExtractFolder
23 i f [ [ ”$?” == ”0” ] ] ; then
24 echo ” [NOTE] Created new unzipping f o l d e r : $ExtractFolder ”
25 else
26 echo ” [ERROR] Couldn ’ t c r e a t e the f o l d e r ! ”
27 exit 1
28 f i
29 f i
30
31 i f [ [ ! −d ” $Ana lys i sFo lder ” ] ] ; then
32 mkdir −p $Ana lys i sFo lder
33 i f [ [ ”$?” == ”0” ] ] ; then
34 echo ” [NOTE] Created new a n a l y s i s f o l d e r : $Ana lys i sFo lder ”
35 else
36 echo ” [ERROR] Couldn ’ t c r e a t e the f o l d e r ! ”
37 exit 1
38 f i
39 f i
40
41
42 pushd $ExtractFolder
43 for f i l e in ${ z i p s [ ∗ ] } ; do
44 echo ” [NOTE] Extract ing : $ f i l e ”
45 unzip −o . . / $ZipFolder / $ f i l e
46 done
47
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48 j s o n S r c F i l e s =( ‘ l s ∗ . j s on | grep −v ” z ip ” ‘ )
49 popd
50
51
52 pushd $Ana lys i sFo lder
53 echo ””
54 echo ” [NOTE] SAVING DATA TO: $Globa lVulnsFi l e ”
55 echo ””
56 echo ”###GLOBAL VULNS FILE $run” > $GlobalVulnsFi l e
57
58 for s r c F i l e in ${ j s o n S r c F i l e s [ ∗ ] } ; do
59 echo ” [NOTE] Pars ing ( $ s ea r chSt r ing ) from : $ s r c F i l e ”
60 #cat Ex t rac t ed Z ip s /nvdcve −1.0−2009. j son | t r −d ” [ : b lank : ] ” | t r −
d ”\n” | sed ” s /\” cve \”:{/\n###/g” | grep −i ” android ”
61 cat . . / $ExtractFolder / $ s r c F i l e | t r −d ” [ : blank : ] ” | t r −d ”\n” |
sed ” s /\” cve\” :{/\n###/g” | grep − i ’ ”product name” : ” android ” ’ |
grep − i ’ ”vendor name” : ” goog l e ” ’ >> $GlobalVulnsFi l e
62 done
63 popd
64
65
66 #Get l i s t o f CVEs matching search s t r i n g
67 cat $GlobalVulnsFi l e | grep ID | grep a f f e c t s | t r ”\”” ”\n” | grep ”CVE
” >> $runDate” CVEs . txt ”
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Appendix B. Chapter 2 Related Documents
The following appendix contains documentation leveraged in the work present in
Chapter 2.
B.1 Android Security Features added by Version Release
The following Tables 17 and 18 are based on the documentation by Google [87]
[88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [54].
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Table 17. Highlighted Android Security Features (1.5 to 4.4)
Android Release Feature
1.5 Stack Protection (fstack-protector)
1.5 Integer Overflow Reduction (via safe iop and OpenBSD calloc)
1.5 Chunk Consolidation Attack Prevention (OpenBSD dlmalloc)
1.5 Format string protections (compiler format-security options)
2.3 No eXecute (NX) for code execution on the stack and heap
2.3 Mitigation of null pointer dereference escalation attacks
4.0 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
4.1 Position Independent Executable (PIE) Support
4.1 Read-only relocation/immediate binding
4.1 Ensure settings avoid leaking kernel addresses
4.2 App verification (via digital signatures)
4.2 Root privilege escalation prevention (installed)
4.2 Symlink attack prevention (0 NOFOLLOW)
4.2 ContentProvider Default Configuration for Apps
4.3 SELinux used to reinforce Android sandbox
4.3 Removed all setuid/setgid programs
4.3 Preventing applications from executing setuid programs
4.3 Capability bounding; drop unnecessary capabilities prior to execution
4.3 AndroidKeyStore Provider (restricted App private keys)
4.3 NO NEW PRIVS: Linux kernel version 3.5 to block new privileges prior to code execution
4.3 Detection of memory corruption vulnerabilities or unterminated string constants.
4.3 Read only relocation allowed (static linked executables); removed all text relocation
4.4 SELinux in enforcing mode for the Android Sandbox
4.4 Implemented FORTIFY SOURCE level 2 protections
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Table 18. Highlighted Android Security Features (5.0 to 8.0)
Android Release Feature
5.0 Full disk encryption by default
5.0 Requirement of all dynamically linked executables to support PIE
5.0 SELinux enforcing mode is required for all domains
5.0 non-PIE linker support removed
5.0 Improvements to FORTIFY SOURCE
6.0 Applications request permissions at run time (vs. install time)
6.0 Hardware-Isolated Security via new HAL to protect Kernel/local access compromise
6.0 SELinux enforced polices to ensure better isolation of users, /proc access, etc.
6.0 File-based encryption (vs. a single storage area)
7.0 SELinux enhancements for application sandbox
7.0 Kernel hardening (read only portions, user space addresses, etc.)
8.0 “Project Treble” - isolation of patching/Android processes from vendor-specific changes
8.0 Migration from ASLR, format string, and fstack-protector
8.0 Kernel protections with seccomp filtering
8.0 Per app approval of “unknown sources” installation
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Appendix C. Chapter 4 Related Documents
The following appendix contains source code and scripts leveraged in the work
present in Chapter 4.
C.1 KLEE: KLEE Docker Install Script
1 #!/ bin / bash
2 #From: h t t p s :// docs . docker . com/ engine / i n s t a l l a t i o n / l i nu x /docker−ce/
ubuntu/#i n s t a l l −docker−ce
3
4 echo ” [KDI ] S ta r t i ng KLEE Docker I n s t a l l e r ”
5 echo ” [KDI ] ==============================”
6
7 echo ” [KDI ] Cleaning up p r i o r Docker I n s t a l l a t i o n . . . ”
8 sudo apt−get update
9
10 sudo apt−get remove −y docker docker−eng ine docker . i o
11
12 #FOR Ubuntu 14 .04 :
13 #sudo apt−ge t i n s t a l l \
14 # linux−image−extra−$ (uname −r ) \
15 # linux−image−extra−v i r t u a l
16
17 echo ” [KDI ] I n s t a l l i n g Deps ( apt−t ransport−https ca−c e r t s c u r l sw−props−
common) . . . ”
18 sudo apt−get i n s t a l l −y\
19 apt−t ransport−https \
20 ca−c e r t i f i c a t e s \
21 c u r l \
22 software−prope r t i e s−common
23
24 echo ” [KDI ] I n s t a l l i n g GPG Key . . . ”
25 Ins ta l l edKey =‘ c u r l −fsSL https : // download . docker . com/ l inux /ubuntu/gpg |
sudo apt−key add − 2>&1 | grep ”OK” | wc −l ‘
26
27 i f [ [ ” $ Ins ta l l edKey ” != ”1” ] ] ; then
28 echo ” [KDI ] [ERROR] The Ubuntu GPG Key DID NOT i n s t a l l ! ”
29 exit
30 f i
31
32 VerifyKey=‘sudo apt−key f i n g e r p r i n t 0EBFCD88 2>&1 | grep ” rsa4096
2017−02−22” | wc −l ‘
33 i f [ [ ” $VerifyKey ” != ”2” ] ] ; then
34 echo ” [KDI ] [ERROR] The Ubuntu GPG Key Has CHANGED! ”
35
36 #Two l i n e s re turn from t h i s expec ted r e s u l t :
37 #pub rsa4096 2017−02−22 [SCEA]
38 # 9DC8 5822 9FC7 DD38 854A E2D8 8D81 803C 0EBF CD88
39 #uid [ unknown ] Docker Release (CE deb ) <docker@docker . com
>
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40 #sub rsa4096 2017−02−22 [ S ]
41 exit
42 f i
43
44 echo ” [KDI ] Se t t i ng up the docker s t a b l e r e l e a s e repo . . . ”
45 sudo add−apt−r e p o s i t o r y \
46 ”deb [ arch=amd64 ] https : // download . docker . com/ l inux /ubuntu \
47 $ ( l s b r e l e a s e −cs ) \
48 s t a b l e ”
49 sudo apt−get update
50
51 echo ” [KDI ] I n s t a l l i n g Docker . . . ”
52 sudo apt−get i n s t a l l −y docker−ce
53
54 echo ” [KDI ] Running Docker He l lo World . . . ”
55 sudo docker run he l l o−world
56
57 #echo ” [KDI] Grabbing KLEE pre−b u i l t ”
58 #The i n s t r u c t i o n s s t a t e t ha t t h e r e i s 3 rd par ty code . . . so I ’m bu i l d i n g
i t f o r now . . .
59 #docker p u l l k l e e / k l e e
60
61 echo ” [KDI ] Grabbing KLEE−needed Docker f i l e s . . . ”
62 g i t c l one https : // github . com/ k l e e / k l e e . g i t
63 cd k l e e
64
65 sudo usermod −aG docker $USER
66
67 docker bu i ld −t k l e e / k l e e .
68 docker run −−rm − t i −−ulimit=’ stack =−1:−1’ k l e e / k l e e
69
70 whoami
C.2 KLEE: KLEE Docker Start Script
1 #!/ bin / bash
2 #This i s NOT p e r s i s t e n t : docker run −−rm − t i −−u l im i t =’ s t a c k=−1:−1’ k l e e
/ k l e e
3
4 containerName=” m y f i r s t k l e e c o n t a i n e r ”
5 containerMade=‘ docker ps −a | grep m y f i r s t k l e e c o n t a i n e r | wc −l ‘
6
7 echo ” [KCL] S ta r t i ng KLEE Container Launcher”
8 echo ” [KCL] ================================”
9
10 echo ” [DEBUGGING] containerMade va l : $containerMade ”
11
12 i f [ [ ” $containerMade ” == ”1” ] ] ; then
13 echo ” [KCL] Container FOUND! Sta r t i ng o ld in s t anc e . . . ”
14 docker s t a r t −a i $containerName
15 else
16 echo ” [KCL] Container NOT FOUND! Creat ing NEW ins tance . . . ”
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17 docker run − t i −−name=$containerName −−ulimit=’ stack =−1:−1’ k l e e / k l e e
18 f i
C.3 GoLLVM Ubuntu Installer Script
1 #!/ bin / bash
2 #// Here ’ workarea ’ w i l l conta in a copy o f the LLVM source t r e e and one
or more b u i l d areas
3
4 echo ” [SGU] S ta r t i ng Setup Gollvm f o r Ubuntu”
5 echo ” [SGU] ================================”
6
7 echo ” [SGU] I n s t a l l i n g Deps (gmp mpfr mpc) ”
8 #sudo apt−ge t i n s t a l l −y g i t cmake m4 bu i l d−e s s e n t i a l l ibgmp−dev l i bmpfr
−dev libmpc−dev l i bxml2−dev ocaml l i b c t y p e s−ocaml
9 sudo apt−get update
10 sudo apt−get i n s t a l l −y g i t cmake m4 bui ld−e s s e n t i a l libgmp−dev l ibmpfr−
dev libmpc−dev gccgo−6
11
12 #Get Ninja
13 #h t t p s :// g i t hu b . com/ninja−b u i l d / n in ja / r e l e a s e s
14 n i n j a I n s t a l l e d =‘which n in j a | wc −l ‘
15 i f [ [ $ n i n j a I n s t a l l e d == ”0” ] ] ; then
16 echo ” [SGU] I n s t a l l i n g Ninja ”
17 wget https : // github . com/ ninja−bu i ld / n in j a / r e l e a s e s /download/v1 . 8 . 2 /
ninja−l i nux . z ip
18 i f [ [ −f n in ja−l i nux . z ip ] ] ; then
19 unzip ninja−l i nux . z ip
20 sudo mv n in j a / usr / bin /
21 f i
22 f i
23
24 n i n j a I n s t a l l e d =‘which n in j a | wc −l ‘
25 i f [ [ $ n i n j a I n s t a l l e d == ”1” ] ] ; then
26 echo ” [SGU] Ninja i n s t a l l e d ”
27 echo ” [SGU] Cloning LLVM”
28 #Sources
29 g i t c l one http :// llvm . org / g i t / l lvm . g i t
30
31 i f [ [ −d llvm ] ] ; then
32 pushd l lvm > /dev/ n u l l
33 g i t r e s e t −−hard 3962 d561a63fb3912c9310838793863ce5818cba #Last
commit from Than McIntosh , pre−LLVM 3 changes ( Sep 27 , 2017)
34 cd t o o l s
35
36 echo ” [SGU] Cloning Clang”
37 g i t c l one http :// llvm . org / g i t / c lang . g i t
38 i f [ [ −d c lang ] ] ; then
39 pushd c lang
40 g i t r e s e t −−hard 29487927 c0f5d8cd6b23978a0216b17041161cc5 #Last
commit on Sep 27 , 2017
41 #OPTIONAL TOOLS:
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42 cd t o o l s
43 g i t c l one http :// llvm . org / g i t / clang−t oo l s−ext ra . g i t ext ra
44 cd ext ra
45 g i t r e s e t −−hard 1 c6297911930ae6ad88a3383eb4c88a27460eb54 #Last
commit on Sep 27 , 2017
46 popd
47 else
48 echo ” [SGU] [ERROR] Clang c lone FAILED! ”
49 f i
50
51 echo ” [SGU] Cloning gollvm ”
52 g i t c l one https : // go . goog l e sour c e . com/ gollvm
53 i f [ [ −d gollvm ] ] ; then
54 cd gollvm /
55 g i t r e s e t −−hard 0 b6e1072828dd59cead801c01d548675bedae644 #Most
recen t o f t h i s s c r i p t c r ea t i on
56 cd llvm−gofrontend
57 g i t c l one https : // go . goog l e sour c e . com/ gofrontend
58 cd gofrontend
59 g i t r e s e t −−hard adc6eb826 f156d0980 f0ad9f9e fc5c919ec4905e #Most
recen t o f t h i s s c r i p t c r ea t i on
60 #cd . . / . . / . . / . .
61 popd > /dev/ n u l l
62
63 #// Create a b u i l d d i r e c t o r y and run cmake
64 echo ” [SGU] Bui ld ing gollvm ”
65 mkdir −p bu i ld . opt
66 cd bu i ld . opt
67 cmake −DCMAKE BUILD TYPE=Debug −G Ninja . . / l lvm #Clang dev
reccomends : −DLLVM BUILD TESTS=ON # Enable t e s t s ; d e f a u l t i s
o f f .
68
69 #// Prebu i l d
70 echo ” [SGU] S ta r t i ng n in j a bu i ld o f gmp/mpfr/mpc”
71 n in j a libgmp l ibmpfr libmpc
72
73 #// Now regu l a r b u i l d
74 #ninja <go l l vm t a r g e t ( s )>
75 echo ” [SGU] S ta r t i ng n in j a bu i ld o f LLVM/Clang/ gollvm ”
76 #JUST FOR gol l vm : n in ja l lvm−goparse
77 #ninja a l l
78 n in j a i n s t a l l
79 echo ” [SGU] DONE! ”
80 else
81 echo ” [SGU] [ERROR] gollvm c lone FAILED! ”
82 f i
83
84 else
85 echo ” [SGU] [ERROR] LLVM clone FAILED! ”
86 f i
87
88 else
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89 echo ” [SGU] [ERROR] Ninja NOT INSTALLED! ”
90 f i
C.4 GoLLVM Example Go Code
1 //A simple example o f Go to test with gollvm : llvm−goparse −dump− i r −o
Example . IR example . go
2 package foo
3
4 func main ( ) i n t {
5 return 1
6 }
C.5 GoLLVM Attempted KLEE Integration Code
1 package foo
2
3 // import (
4 // ” unsa fe ”
5 //)
6
7 func main ( ) i n t {
8 var a i n t
9 // k lee make symbol i c (&a , unsa fe . S i z e o f ( a ) ,1 )
10 return g e t s i g n ( a )
11 }
12
13 func g e t s i g n ( x i n t ) i n t {
14 i f x == 0 {
15 return 0
16 }
17 i f x < 0 {
18 return −1
19 } else {
20 return 1
21 }
22 }
115
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704–0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704–0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection
of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD–MM–YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From — To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT
18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8–98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
22–03–2018 Master’s Thesis Sept 2016 — Mar 2018
Assured Android Execution Environments
N/A
Froberg, Brandon P., Capt, USAF
Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Way
WPAFB OH 45433-7765
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-027
Air Force Research Laboratory - Information Directorate
Information Exploitation & Operations Division
525 Brooks Road
Rome, NY 13441-4505
DSN 578-4459, COMM 315-330-4459
Email: edward.ratazzi@us.af.mil
AFRL/RIG
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
This material is declared a workd of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States
The goal of this research is to determine methods of assuring isolation when executing Android software in a contained
environment. A three-stage methodology called “The Formal Verification Cycle” is presented. This cycle focuses on the
iteration over a set of security properties to validate each within a specification and their verification within a software
implementation. A security property can be validated when its functional language prototype (e.g. a Haskell coded
version of the property) is converted and processed by a formal method (e.g. a theorem proof assistant). This validation
of the property enables the definition of the property in a software specification, which can be implemented separately in
an imperative programming language (e.g. the Go programming language). Once the implementation is complete another
formal method can be used (e.g symbolic execution) to verify the imperative implementation satisfies the validated
specification. Successful completion of this cycle shows a given implmentation is equivalent to a functional language
prototype, and this cycle assures a specification for the original desired security properties was properly implemented.
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